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The Soviet Navy has developed into a major naval power. As such, it
operates under certain geographical and legal constraints. This thesis
concerns itself with those constraints as they relate to straits.
Four sets of international straits are examined: the Sea of Japan
straits, the Danish Straits, the Turkish Straits, and the Indonesian
straits. The analysis describes them physically, explains their legal
regimes, discusses Soviet naval transits of the straits, relates the
transits to Soviet naval missions, explores possible alternative routes
to using the straits, postulates new legal regimes for the straits, and,
finally, reaches conclusions concerning the Soviet reaction to the
possible legal changes.
From the investigation of the four sets of international straits,
general conclusions are drawn which parallel each section of the analysis,
Additional conclusions are then formulated as to the extent that inter-
national straits affect Soviet naval operations and to the extent that
their influence on naval operations has shaped the Soviet legal position
on the law of the sea.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY
In the wake of the Russian Civil War, the 1917 Soviet
Navy was in a condition which might best be described as
"junk." The new Soviet government appreciated the effect
of sea power during the Revolution when naval blockades
prevented the Bolsheviks from receiving supplies while White
Russian forces were reinforced through secure lines of ocean
communications. The Government knew a navy was important for
defending Soviet frontiers but it also saw that the building
of a Soviet Navy would be no simple task.
The period of world peace following the Russian Revolution
gave the Soviets the" respite they needed to revive their lost
naval power while the rest of the world powers were conclud-
ing treaties to limit the size of their naval forces. German
technicians and former tsarist officers became the nucleus
of the new Soviet Navy. Since industrial capabilities and
technical knowledge were lacking, the Soviets relied on
American, French, Italian, German, and British ship plans,
salvaging sunk or damaged vessels, and construction in foreign
yards to provide the ships for their new naval force.
Still, before World War II, a strong Soviet Navy was not
usually considered necessary in peacetime. Though the Navy
was slowly rebuilt, policy insisted that the Soviet Navy
support the Soviet Army's objectives and the Navy was designed
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for defense of Soviet territory in time of war. (27:370-371)
The events leading up to World War II alerted the Soviet
government to the possibility of conflict so that, even in a
defensive role, the Soviets perceived a need to enlarge
their seapower. The Japanese presence in Manchuria, the
accession of Adolf Hitler, the Japanese denouncement of naval
treaties, the German abrogation of the Versailles Treaty, and
the Italian/Japanese/German Anti-Komintern Pact goaded Stalin
into reestablishing Soviet seapower in its four traditional
areas: the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the
Pacific Ocean. While Stalin was negotiating to secure
battleships from the United States, Soviet seapower was
beginning to be supplied by Soviet industry which, during
1938 and 1339, arrived at the stage where naval construction
was possible.
The late 1930' s was a critical period for the Soviet
Navy. The new-school defensive policies came under attack
by Stalin. Purges of the naval heirarchy left commanders who
favored Stalin's concept of an ocean-going fleet. Large
numbers of new warships were commissioned. A Soviet Navy Day
was proclaimed for annual celebration. Wholesale promotions
of high-ranking naval officers were begun and the ranks of
admiral aiM vice admiral, abolished since 1918,' were restored.
The goal of the newly emerging naval policy was to build the
Soviet Navy into a major sea power. (27:374) The February 3,
1938, edition of Pravda quoted P.I. Smirnov, Navy Commissar,





modern sea and ocean navy. So decided the party. So
decided the government. The whole Soviet people so decided."
Stalin viewed large surface ships as prestige symbols
which were indispensible to a powerful state which he
believed the Soviet Union had become. The Soviet Navy had
previously relied on small surface ships and a large sub-
marine force but, in the late 1930 ? s, laid the groundwork
for becoming larger and stronger so as to become a powerful
representative of Soviet policy. At the outbreak of World
War II, the top Soviet leadership had departed from a
defensive naval philosophy but the Soviet Navy was still
tied to a defensive doctrine and had still not achieved
status as a strong naval power.
During World War II, the Soviet Navy operated close to
Soviet borders in its traditional defensive posture. Post-
war Soviet publications portray the Soviet Navy as, "a
brave defender of the Russian coastline, and it is a close
ally of the Red army." (27:453) It is clear, then, that the
Soviet Navy was still a minor consideration in Soviet mili-
tary capabilities. In addition to being labeled a secondary
force, to compound the miseries of Soviet naval leaders,
World War II had left the Soviet Navy in poor material shape.
Ships had been lost, ports and industrial facilities had
been wrecked, and Soviet manpower and industry had deteri-
orated. Nevertheless, the postwar Soviet Union resumed
naval modernization and expansion which the war had inter-
rupted. Maritime expansion was facilitated by territorial
13

expansion resulting from war gains. The major gains were
warm water ports in the Baltic and strategic territory in
the Pacific.
Stalin's 1945 Navy Day address reaffirmed his prewar
doctrine of building a large navy to represent Soviet
interests abroad. Initial naval expansion was based on
wartime aid from allies and ships formerly belonging to
enemies. Subsequent expansion was soon supported by Soviet
industry and technology. By 1950, Stalin had approved con-
struction of a large surface fleet which was to include air-
craft carriers and heavy cruisers. The death of Stalin,
however, was also the death of Stalin's plan for a large
Soviet Navy.
Nikita Khruschev brought change to the Soviet Navy in
the early 1950's. He was not interested in seapower.
(27:476) Under Khruschev's leadership, the Soviet Navy
reverted to a defensive strategy based on submarines and
gave up some foreign base rights as part of its change of
posture. During this time, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov was
appointed Fleet Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Navy.
In the mid-1950' s, Khruschev reduced military expendi-
tures by cutting down on military manpower and mothballing
naval ships. He viewed future wars as nuclear wars fought
between super powers and saw no need for conventional naval
weapons. The view was steadfastly maintained and, in July,
1964, he continued his policy by stating, "Ten years ago the
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question was asked about the necessity to rearm our Navy
. .
.
This weapon to a great extent has become outmoded for con-
ducting wars in modern conditions ..." (25:282) Khruschev
apparently saw no use for a navy in a peacetime role. After
1955, Soviet naval policy under Khruschev* s regime dictated
the rapid development of long-range missiles and an improve-
ment in the quality of submarines while Khruschev threatened
to scrap the navy's surface vessels.
Khruschev may have learned a hard lesson, though, when
United States' surface naval vessels performed a successful
naval blockade against ships carrying Soviet missiles to
Cuba in 1962. Shortly after the Cuban incident, growth of
the Soviet Navy was observed. Because of the long process
required to produce an operational ship, Cuba was probably
not the only experience which spurred the growth of the
Soviet Navy and a change to Khruschev 's policy but the
bitter Soviet experience in Cuba certainly must have been
convincing.
The Soviet submarine force has experienced a major
decline in number of units. The reason is the decommission-
ing of large numbers of obsolete conventional submarines.
They have been replaced by fewer but newer types of sub-
marines which have greater capabilities. The force has
achieved nuclear propulsion and is capable of attack by
long-range-strategic missiles, cruise missiles, and
torpedoes. Even though the Soviet submarine force has
decreased in numbers, it is still larger than the force of
its chief competitor, the United States Navy. (2:42)
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The Soviet surface force has not changed greatly in num-
bers but tonnage has diminished. This indicates a change to
construction of smaller ships but, like the submarine force,
the Soviet surface navy is more capable than the pre-Cuba
force. A large portion of the surface force is relatively
new and newer weapons give it greater firepower than its •
predecessor. This can be attributed to the development of
shipboard missile systems. (2:6-8) A picture of future
developments might be indicated by the construction of two
large antisubmarine cruisers and what appears to be an air-
craft carrier.
Probably the two most significant events which contri-
buted to the capability of the Soviet Navy were the deploy-
ment of the Yankee-class submarine in 1968, which gave the
Soviets a direct naval threat against the continental United
States, and the deployment of large numbers of cruise
missiles, which gave Soviet ships an anti-surface-ship
capability and allowed them to challenge United States naval
ships on the high seas and in regions of traditional Western
naval domination such as the Mediterranean Sea.
Evidence of the newfound importance of the Soviet Navy
is seen in the patterns of Soviet naval operations. Soviet
naval ship visits outside the Black and Baltic Seas were
rare before 1957 and, until that time, exercises were
limited to the Black, Baltic, and Barents Seas. (2:12) In
1964, the Soviet Navy began a continuous deployment in the
Mediterranean Sea which grew into a major presence by 1967.
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Soviet naval ships commenced a regular deployment to the
Indian Ocean in 1968. Surface warships began sorties into
the Pacific Ocean in 1963, the Caribbean in 1969, and the
West African coast in 1970. In 1970, the Soviet Navy held
its first exercise of global dimensions. (2:12-15) Expanded
naval activity must have meant that the Soviet leadership
realized a peacetime mission for the Soviet Navy.
Additional evidence of the ascension of the Soviet Navy's
fortune is that the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy,
the same Admiral Gorshkov appointed by Khruschev, is also a
Deputy Minister of Defense and a member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. Admiral Gorshkov might as
well have quoted Stalin when Gorshkov wrote, "Every social-
economic system has built up armed forces, including navies,
commensurate with its economic and technical capabilities."
(13:100/1/851:23)
The world is waking to the fact that the Soviet Navy is
now an important force • for supporting Soviet policies. The
strike capability of the Soviet strategic submarine force
was announced in United States newspapers on 4 October 1974
under the byline, "Russian Missiles Travel 4,900 miles."
On 29 August 1974, newspapers had reported, "Jane's Sees Red
fleet Growing as West Lags." Whether the United States Navy
or the Soviet Navy is now the world' s strongest naval power
is not clear but is a matter for conjecture. Whether in
first place or in second place, the Soviet Navy has clearly
developed into a powerful force in support of the objectives
of the Soviet government.
17

The Soviet Navy is credited with a variety of capabili-
ties. A general list of probable missions would include
strategic offense, strategic defense, support of foreign
policy objectives, projection of land and air power overseas,
interdiction of sea lanes of communication, and sustained
combat at sea. (2:15-31) The Soviet Navy has grown, as the
Soviet nation has grown, from "primitive" beginnings,
through times of war and times of policy conflict, to become
a contending force in the arena of world powers.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
The law of the sea is of particular importance to any
nation which has an interest in seapower because it affects
a navy's access to the world's sea lanes which are vital to
the effective functioning of a nation's navy. The formation
of sea law, then, will be of importance to the Soviet Union
because the Soviet Navy has become an agent which represents
Soviet governmental policy in areas remote from Soviet
borders.
Modern debate on the law of the sea began in the seven-
teenth century. In 1609, Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist,
argued that the sea was open to all nations. His argument
developed the concept of freedom of the high seas. Freedom
of the seas means freedom to use the seas without regulation
by coastal state jurisdiction. Any use of the seas was
permitted so long as a ship's use of seaspace did not inter-
fere with other ships' rights to use the seas.
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The rebuttal to Grotius' argument came from John Selden,
a British jurist, who wrote, in 1635, to support the concept
•of closed seas. Selden argued, in effect, the position of
the Spanish and the Portuguese whose intent had been to
divide the world's oceans between them. The concept of
closed seas divided sovereignty over ocean space among the
nations of the world.
Grotius' concept of open seas became ocean law. The
victory of the open seas policy was nearly predestined
because the law of the sea was heavily influenced by the
nation whose seapower was strong enough to dictate ocean
policy. The law of the sea was traditional and unwritten.
The world's strongest seafaring nation was England and,
while England ruled the world's oceans, England promoted
the concept of freedom of the high seas. Her reason for
supporting high seas freedoms was obviously to ensure that
her ships would be granted the right to range over the seas
to any location where England might derive some benefit or
desire to exert some influence.
Freedom of the high seas became traditional inter-
national law. The only exception to high seas freedom was
the reserved status of internal and territorial waters.
Both were waters which were controllable by a nation either
because the waters were within national boundaries, in the
case of internal waters, or, reputedly, within canon-shot
range of a nation's coastline, in the case of territorial
waters. Restrictions to the use of these waters still left
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most of the seas open for ship transits. An important
possible exception to high seas freedoms was narrow straits
which were overlapped by the territorial waters of one or
two nations and whose use could be regulated by a coastal
state or coastal states strong enough to do so. Conversely,
these straits could be transited by a navy strong enough to
do so. Some important narrow straits became the subject of
multilateral agreements which regulated their regimes and
which evolved into traditional international law. The usual
status, though, was that ships were permitted "innocent
passage" through international straits. This meant that
ships of one nation were permitted to pass through the
territorial waters of another nation so long as the ship's
transit was not damaging to the peace and security of the
coastal nation.
After World War II, the concept of freedom of the high
seas came to be questioned. The reason for a change in
reasoning was the advancement of technology. Previously,
the oceans had been a highway for ships. New technology
created new uses for the oceans. Oil could be retrieved
from beneath the ocean floor. Minerals could be mined from
the seabed. Fish could be taken in record numbers. All
these made the seas more valuable to the coastal nations
than when the seas were no more than highways. Some nations
became interested in preserving the resources of their
adjacent seas and seabeds for their own use and other nations
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which had the required technology became interested in
exploiting wide ocean expanses.
The first important modern move to restrict ocean use
was made in 1945 by the United States. President Harry S.
Truman announced a national doctrine proclaiming an extension
of national control over, "... the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United
States..." (12:7) (Appendix A) The following thirty years
has seen claims of up to 200 miles for territorial seas and
a great variance of national claims depending on national
interest.
Attempts have been made to establish an internationally
accepted law for the sea. The United Nations sponsored an
international conference which, in 1958, resulted in four
treaties for regulating oceans: Convention on the Continental
Shelf, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (Appendix B) , Convention on the High Seas (Appendix C)
,
and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. These four conventions were
the first attempt at a written general law of the sea. They
codified the points of law on which agreement was easy but
left difficult problems such as width of territorial seas,
archipelagos, international straits, and seabed jurisdiction
either unanswered or partially answered.
The race for control of oceans created differences in
national legal interpretations and national legal desires.
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Some nations wanted narrow territorial seas while others
wanted wide. Some nations wanted free passage of inter-
national straits while other nations wanted control over
straits in their territorial waters. Differences of opinion
existed over whether the seabed should be controlled and who
should control it. National interests have created many
different legal positions depending on a nation's capability
to exploit the oceans and its interest in naval power and in
maritime commerce. To settle these national differences, a
conference to determine a. new law of the sea was convened
under United Nations sponsorship in June, 1974. The first
substantive meeting, at Caracas, Venezuela, produced no
consensus. The second session of the Third Law of the Sea
Conference will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, in March,
1975. Consensus will probably be difficult to reach at that
conference also. The future of the law of the sea is
pending.
C. CONFLICT
The development of the Soviet Navy, the development of
the law of the sea, and Soviet government policies for
naval employment are in natural conflict. "... the Russian
Navy supports traditional legal freedoms of the high seas,
so as to give her ships the greatest access to the world's
oceans." (21:52) Contrary to these aims, ocean law has
tended to become more restrictive to ocean freedoms.
Naval geography is the reason for Soviet concern with
ocean freedoms. The Soviet Navy appears to be constrained
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by straits through which her ships must pass to reach many
of their operating areas and, in many cases, to reach open
oceans. The Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet are com-
pletely bottled in by narrow waterways. The Pacific Fleet's
warm water ports are all in locations from which access to
open oceans is controlled by narrow waterways. The North
Fleet is in the most advantageous position but is still
required to pass through the Greenland- Iceland-United Kingdom
Gap for access to the Atlantic Ocean.
Considering the restrictions of naval geography, it is
easy to understand why Soviet naval objectives might be
hampered by changes to the law of the sea which could create
a regime which might threaten the Soviet Navy's access to
its operating areas. ±no conflict, then, can uc seen Lo
affect the Soviet Navy mostly in the question of passage of
international straits. (See Appendix D) The Soviet answer
to the strait problem was presented in their Draft Articles
on Straits Used for International Navigation
. (Appendix E)
The articles state:
In straits used for international navigation between
one part of the high seas and another part of the high
seas, all ships in transit shall enjoy the same freedom
of navigation, for the purpose of transit through such
straits, as they have on the high seas. (38:40)
The task of this paper will be to explore the conflict be-
tween Soviet naval operations and the regimes of international





To examine the extent to which international straits
might affect Soviet naval operations, specific areas of the
greatest significance should first be selected for individual
evaluation. The significant straits would be those for
which control by coastal nations would be possible. (See
Appendix J) These straits would be among the 16 major
straits of at least 116 straits which would be overlapped
by territorial seas if the accepted breadth of territorial
seas were established at 12 miles. (42:27) From those six-
teen straits, the scope of investigation should be narrowed
to those straits which fall on the major routes used by
Soviet naval ships. This paper considers those to be the
Danish Straits, the Turkish Straits, the Sea of Japan
straits, and the Indonesian straits.
The procedure for analysis will be to describe each set
of straits physically and describe the legal regime which
applies to it. Then the use the Soviet Navy makes of each
strait will be determined so that the strait transits may
be related to Soviet naval missions. Soviet naval missions
are all considered to fall into the categories of strategic,
defense of homeland, naval presence, and protection of
economic interest. The next step in analysis is to discover
alternate routes the Soviet Navy might use to accomplish the
same missions, thereby assessing the inconvenience to the
Soviet Navy if straits were not available for transit. Then
possible new regimes for the straits are discussed to determine
24

whether transits of Soviet naval ships might be interrupted
Lastly, the effects of present and possible new regimes for
straits are used as the basis for discussing the proposed
Soviet reaction to the changed regime of a strait.
From the analysis of the four sets of straits, an
assessment of the effect of international straits on Soviet
naval operations will be made in order to examine the
hypothesis that the legal status of certain international
straits significantly affects Soviet naval operations and
the hypothesis that the Soviet position on the proper legal
status for international straits reflects a Soviet interest
in protecting naval rights of passage.
25

II. THE SEA OF JAPAN STRAITS
A. DESCRIPTION
Three straits are suitable for navigation of ships
traveling into or exiting from the Sea of Japan. The nav-
igable straits are Korea Strait, Tsugaru Strait, and La Perouse
Strait. A fourth waterway exists but it is not suitable for
passage of larger ships. It separates Honshu and Kyushu,
then splits to run north and south of Shikoku. The passage
narrows to about a half mile between Honshu and Kyushu making
it a dangerous and impractical route for shipping because of
its physical dimensions and because other more practical and
more convenient sea lane? a^e available for ships transiting
from Soviet ports to the open ocean. The sea lane between
Honshu and Kyushu is entirely within Japanese territorial




The Korea Strait connects the Sea of Japan and the
East China Sea between the south coast of Korea and southwest
Japan (Kyushu) . About 110 miles separate the two coasts but
the span is interrupted by two Japanese islands, Tsushima
and Iki Shima, which divide the channel to form two main
shipping channels. The name "Korea Strait" sometimes is
used to refer only to the western channel between Tsushima
and the coast of Korea. The western channel is 26 miles
26

wide and is of sufficient depth to allow the passage of deep
draft vessels. The eastern channel, sometimes called the
Tsushima Strait, stretches 25 miles from Tsushima Island to
Iki Shima, which is the westernmost of the islands lying off
the western coast of Kyushu. The Tsushima Strait is also
suitable for passage of deep-draft vessels.
2. Tsugaru Strait
Tsugaru Strait separates the Japanese Islands of
Honshu and Hokkaido. It connects the Sea of Japan with the
Pacific Ocean. The Strait is about 38 miles long between
the narrows at its entrance and exit, 10.5 miles in breadth
at its narrowest point, and 240 feet deep at its shallowest
location. At its eastern gate to the Pacific Ocean, the
current sometimes flows up to 7 knots in an easterly direc-
tion. Tsugaru is the northernmost strait through the
Japanese islands which remains unfrozen in winter.
3. LaPerouse Strait
LaPerouse Strait connects the Sea of Japan and the
Sea of Okhotsk. It lies between Sakhalin, a Soviet posses-
sion, and Hokkaido, a Japanese possession. The Strait is
23 miles wide and has a limiting depth of 90 feet in the
navigable parts of the channel with one well-marked shoal
area 9 miles southeast of the southern tip of Sakhalin.
LaPerouse is frozen over in winter.
27







B. REGIME OF THE SEA OF JAPAN STRAITS
No special international agreements regulate the regime
of the straits providing access to the Sea of Japan. The
only regulatory mechanisms are those provided by international
law and by unilateral claims.
The Korea Strait is bordered by Korea and Japan which
both claim a three mile limit to territorial waters. Under
international law, both sections of the Strait have large,
navigable breadths which are part of the high seas so that
complete freedom of navigation and overflight should be
granted. The only exception to the possibility of high seas
freedom is the unilateral Korean claim of the "Rhee Line"
within which the Korean government declared that it exer-
cises control over navigation of shipping and overflight.
(1:46) The line passes about four miles to the west of
Tsushima in the Strait's western channel which means that,
if the "Rhee Line" is respected, a one-mile channel exists
in the western section of the Korea Strait in which high seas
freedoms exist. The eastern channel provides a breadth of
19 miles in which all ships and aircraft enjoy high seas
freedom.
The Tsugaru Strait is bounded on both shores by Japanese
islands so that the limit to territorial waters is, again,
three miles on both extremes of the breadth of the Strait.
Tsugaru also provides a shipping lane of high seas freedoms




LaPerouse Strait lies between the Soviet Union and
Japan. While the Japanese government claims only a three
mile territorial sea on the southern extreme, the Soviets
claim a twelve mile territorial sea to the north. These
claims leave a channel of high seas which is 8-1/2 miles
at its narrowest point.
Under their present regimes, the three major straits
which provide access to and from the Sea of Japan may all
be traversed without submission to regulation by any ship
of any nation because channels are present through all the
straits where the waters are classified as "high seas."
The regime of the high seas permits freedom of use by
merchant ships, warships, and aircraft with regulation of
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road. The territorial waters bordering the landward
portions of the straits would be governed by the rules of
innocent passage which would still allow transit of
merchant and military ships.
In 1951, at the San Francisco conference which convened
to draw up a peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union
proposed that the Sea of Japan should be classified as a
"closed sea" so that, while its straits would remain open
for the passage of all merchant ships, the straits would be.
closed to the warships of all nations except those of the
Sea of Japan coastal States. The proposal was not adopted.
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C. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS
All three straits are important for the transit of
Soviet naval ships. The bulk of the Soviet Navy ships
assigned Pacific home ports are stationed at bases in the
Sea of Japan. (27:484) The exceptions are ballistic-
missile-firing submarines which are based at Petropavlovsk
on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The submarines are stationed
there so that they will not be required to transit straits
when proceeding to station. The problems with the northern
ports are ice in the winter and difficult logistic lines.
Because of the icing conditions, other Pacific Fleet ships
are homeported in southern locations which. are located on
the Sea of Japan. Passage through the Sea of Japan straits
is necessary for those ships to deploy and return to
pacific bases.
The Korea Strait is used by ships deploying to the
Indian Ocean, the Philippine Sea, the South China Sea, and
the South Pacific. Tsugaru Strait is most convenient for
ships proceeding to mid-Pacific. LaPerouse Strait is used
by ships operating in the Arctic or which used Arctic
waters to change home ports between the North Fleet and the
Pacific Fleet.
D. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS RELATED TO SOVIET NAVAL MISSIONS
1 . Strategic Mission
The ships required to transit the Sea of Japan
straits do not have a strategic mission. Because submarines
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are easy to detect when passing through straits, Soviet
ballistic-missile-firing submarines are based in Petropav-
lovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. From Petropavlovsk, the
submarines have immediate access to the open seas of the
Pacific Ocean. If the submarines were based at Sea of
Japan ports, they would have less problems with ice in
winter and logistic support would be simpler. Nevertheless,
Petropavlovsk is closer to the west coast of the United
States and the submarines can proceed to their patrol areas
without any requirement to transit on the surface or to
facilitate detection by passing through straits. The Soviet
Navy has obviously determined that the advantages of basing
strategic submarines at Petropavlovsk outweigh the advan-
tages of basing them in Sea of Japan ports. The straits
providing access to the Sea of Japan are, therefore, not
relevant to the Soviet Navy's strategic mission.
2. Defense of the Homeland '
Defense of the Soviet homeland is an important mis-
sion of Soviet naval ships transiting the Sea of Japan
straits. Soviet naval surface ships and submarines can
transit Tsugaru Strait to intercept United States surface
ships and submarines approaching launch range to the Soviet
Union. Transit of the Korea Strait is most convenient to
defend against a possible sea attack by ships from west Asian
or South Pacific nations. The Korea Strait is also useful
to Soviet ships, and especially attack submarines, transit-
ing to the Indian Ocean where they could be on station to
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blunt an attack against Soviet territory by United States
ballistic-missile- firing submarines
.
Within the confines of the Sea of Japan, a defen-
sive Soviet naval force is of little value. By the time
an enemy approaches the shores of the Soviet Union, the
winner of the war will have already been determined because
a sophisticated enemy can launch powerful weapons at the
Soviet Union from outside the Sea of Japan. An unsophisti-
cated enemy would not have a chance against Soviet military
power so that any aggressive action would be of a harrassing
nature and not designed as an attack on Soviet territory in
which an unsophisticated nation could never expect to be
successful. The Soviet Union must have the capability to
deploy out of the Sea of Japan in order to prevent the
possibility of long range attacks against its territory so,
in order to accomplish its mission of defending the Soviet
homeland, the Soviet Navy's ships must be allowed to transit
the straits leading out of the Sea of Japan.
3. Naval Presence
Any naval forces supplied by the Pacific Fleet which
contribute to Soviet naval presence must transit the Sea of
Japan straits. The strategic forces based at Petropavlovsk
cannot contribute to naval presence because those forces •
must stay "invisible" in order to accomplish their strategic
mission. The remaining ships which are able to contribute
to naval presence are based in Sea of Japan ports. Pacific
Fleet ships contribute to naval presence throughout the
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Pacific Ocean area and in the Indian Ocean, Naval presence
in the Pacific area is not constant but is limited to major
exercises, scientific expeditions, tests of military systems,
and surveillance. In the Indian Ocean area, though, naval
presence is constant and is nearly totally supplied by ships
from the Pacific Fleet. To support the mission of naval
presence, Soviet naval ships most conveniently could transit
the Tsugaru Strait or the Korea Strait with the Korea Strait
being most important because of normal traffic patterns.
4 . Protection of Economic Interests
While the East Asian area of the Soviet Union is
not one of the most important industrial areas, commerce
must be maintained to that area in order to support the
area's population and twisting industry (including naval
shipbuilding) , and to permit military logistics in support
of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Two methods are available for
communicating with the eastern part of the Soviet Union.
Either the Siberian railroad may be used to carry materials
over land through Soviet territory or sea routes may be
used.
LaPerouse Strait is the route used by ships carrying
commerce from the northern industrial area of the Soviet
union. The route originates in the White and Barents Seas,
traverses the Arctic Ocean near the northern coast of the
Soviet Union, passes through the Bering Strait, and pro-
ceeds to Sea of Okhotsk ports and through the LaPerouse
Strait to Sea of Japan Ports. Included in the military
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logistic use of the LaPerouse Strait is transit of Soviet
naval ships changing home ports between the North Fleet and
the Pacific Fleet. (39:94)
Tsugaru Strait is of limited use for commerce. It
is a good route between Canadian and United States ports
and Sea of Japan ports and could be used interchangeably
with LaPerouse Strait if traffic were halted in one of the
two straits. Since most commerce comes from the south,
except for commerce transiting the Arctic Ocean or coming
from North America, Tsugaru Strait could expect relatively
minimal use and commerce could easily be routed, instead,
through LaPerouse Strait or the Korea Strait into the Sea
of Japan.
The Korea Strait is the route most convenient to
commerce between Sea of Japan ports and the majority of the
Soviet trading partners. (43:777) Ships proceeding to or
coming from a southerly direction have no better alternative
route. While the necessity for such trade is probably
limited, commerce between East Asian, South Pacific, and
Indian Ocean ports and Soviet ports in the Sea of Japan
should require transport through the Korea Strait.
Because the single alternative to transportation of
large quantities of materials to the eastern section of the
Soviet Union by sea is the fragile link provided by the
Trans-Siberian railroad, the sea lanes into the Sea of Japan
are important to the economy of that area. It is important,
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therefore, that the Soviet Navy be available to ensure
unimpeded passage of ships through the Sea of Japan straits
for purposes of commerce and military logistics.
E. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
There are no alternative routes for ships to enter or
exit the Sea of Japan other than by using the Sea of Japan
straits. Though logistics could be maintained by using
overland routes and strategic deterrence would be uninter-
rupted because strategic submarines have immediate access
to open ocean, if the Sea of Japan straits were closed,
Soviet naval presence outside the Sea of Japan and defense
of the Soviet homeland would have to be provided by ships
home ported outside the Sea of Japan or Pacific Fleet ships
could be home ported on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
If Pacific Fleet ships were home ported on the Kamchatka
Peninsula, they would suffer the disadvantages of winter
icing, fragile lines of logistics, and extended distances
to South Pacific and Indian Ocean operating areas.- The
Soviet Union would not only have worse operating ports, they
would also have increased naval requirements because a Sea
of Japan squadron would be required when the Soviet Pacific
Fleet would no longer be available to do double duty in the
Sea of Japan and Pacific areas.
If ships from other Soviet fleets assumed the responsi-
bilities of Pacific Fleet ships, the alternative would
prove even more difficult. The additional duties would be
taxing to the asset utilization of the selected fleet. If
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the fleet chosen were the North Fleet,, the Arctic route
would limit operations in the Pacific Ocean because it is
only open 130 to 150 days each year. In any case, ships
from other fleets would have a longer journey to Pacific
Ocean or Indian Ocean operating areas than ships from the
Pacific Fleet.
No alternative method of accomplishing the missions of
the Pacific Fleet is as satisfactory as the present method
whereby the Pacific Fleet, based in the Sea of Japan,
transits to its operating areas through the Sea of Japan
straits
.
F. POSSIBLE REGIMES FOR THE SEA OF JAPAN STRAITS
Important changes to restrict the regime of any Sea of
Japan strait could be made either by an international body
formed for that purpose or by Japan which borders on all
the Sea of Japan straits. A strong Japanese nation could
completely block any ship attempting to pass through the
straits as it did successfully during World War II. Japan
is a maritime nation, though, and depends on sea transport
for importation of raw materials. Because of its reliance
on sea transport, Japan has taken a conservative position
concerning sea law and has declared only a three mile
territorial sea. The sea lanes are too vital to Japan for
a larger territorial sea claim which might be cited as a
precedent by some other nation as justification for claiming
a wider territorial sea to the detriment of Japanese commerce
The probability that Japan will restrict traffic through the
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Sea of Japan straits* in peacetime is so small as to be un-
worthy of ' consideration. The result is that, if left to
the design of the Japanese government, LaPerouse, Tsugaru,
and the Korea Straits will all be blessed with channels of
"high seas" waters which will permit free transit of merch-
antmen and warships of any nation.
The remaining possibility for a change to the regime of
the Sea of Japan straits is that an international agreement
might be made which could restrict navigation in the straits
This would be a result of the on-going law-of -the-sea con-
ference sponsored by the United Nations. The most probable
result, if any agreement is reached, is that the conference
will arrive at a twelve mile limit to territorial waters.
(32:13) If this is so. and if Japan ratifies the treaty,
the status of the Sea of Japan straits would change in that
LaPerouse Strait would be overlapped by territorial waters,
Tsugaru Strait would be overlapped by territorial waters,
and only a one-mile span of high seas waters would remain in
the Tsushima section of the Korea Strait. The result of
overlapping territorial waters would be that, in accordance
with current international law, innocent passage would be
the only status allowed for ships transiting those waters.
The right of innocent passage means that ships are per-
mitted to pass through a territorial sea without entering a
state's internal waters, to proceed to internal waters, or
to make for high seas from internal waters. Ships may stop
and anchor but only if it is incidental to ordinary
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navigation or necessitated by distress. The passage must
not prejudice the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal state and must be in accordance with international
law. Submarines are required to transit the territorial sea
on the surface and to show their flags. The rules of
innocent passage do not make allowance for overflight of
aircraft which means that permission of a coastal state must
be obtained before a nation may operate aircraft over another
nation's territorial waters. (Appendix B)
Although it v/ould not change the actual status of the
straits, the regime of the Sea of Japan could be changed if
Soviet influence could cause a change in the status of the
sea so that it could be considered a closed sea. In that
situation, the provisions of international law would apply
to Sea of Japan nations and to merchant ships from nations
external to the Sea of Japan. Warships from nations outside
the Sea of Japan would be prohibited from entering. This
change is not likely because it has been resisted consis-
tently by non-communist nations and the probable resultant
domination of the Sea of Japan by Soviet seapower would be
contrary to the national interest of Japan so that the
arrangement would be resisted by the Japanese government
which has not been interested in any restriction to freedom




Extending territorial seas to twelve miles would have
little effect on the missions of the Soviet Navy. Japan pre-
fers a three mile territorial sea but would be willing to
support a twelve mile territorial sea for sake of agreement.
(41:81) The northern half of LaPerouse Strait is already
claimed as the territorial waters of the Soviet Union and
a one-mile span of high seas would still exist in the Korean
(Tsushima) Strait. Through those two straits, the Soviet
Navy would still have unrestricted rights of operating in
the high seas or Soviet territorial sea areas. Tsugaru Strait
would be overlapped by Japanese territorial waters but
Soviet warships would still have the right of innocent passage
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"... provide ships in international straits with a limited
but unambiguous right of transit which would protect them
from highly restrictive or arbitrary control by coastal
states." (41:80-81)
The Soviet Navy could certainly be expected to resist an
effort to bar passage of Soviet ships through the Sea of
Japan straits but the likely changes to the straits' regimes
would not be of sufficient detriment to the Soviet Navy to
cause any opposing reaction. The Soviet Navy would adapt its





III. THE DANISH STRAITS
A. DESCRIPTION
The Danish Straits are three shipping passages between
Denmark and Sweden. They connect the Baltic Sea with the
Kattegat which leads to the Skaggerak, the North Sea, and
the Atlantic Ocean. The three passages are Little Belt,
Great Belt, and The Sound (Oresund)
.
Little Belt is the westernmost channel. It is bordered
by Jutland and Als Island to the west while Fyn and Aero
Islands lie to the East. The channel is thirty miles long
and varies from one-half to twenty miles in width. Minimum
depth of the Little Belt passage is fifty feet.
Great Belt is the center channel consisting of Samso and
Langeland Belts. It is bounded on the west by Fyn and
Langeland Islands and on the east by Zealand and Lolland
Islands. The forty mile channel is about ten miles wide.
The channel depth is 215 feet in the south and varies from
65 to 80 feet in the north.
The Sound, also known as Oresund, is the easternmost of
the three channels. It separates Zealand Island (Denmark)
on the west from the coast of Sweden on the eastern bank.
The length of the channel is eighty-seven miles. Its
average width is seventeen miles but it narrows to 2-1/2
miles between Helsingor and Halsinborg. On the average, the








Nevertheless, it has shoals as shallow as twenty-three feet.
By conforming to the shipping channel, small submarines
could transit The Sound submerged.
The Danish Straits are relatively shallow. The Great
Belt is most suitable for navigation but, even there, only a
few channels are available for the passage of large merchant
vessels and warships. The Little Belt is quite unsuitable
for the passage of large ships.
B. REGIME OF THE DANISH STRAITS
As far back as the tenth century, the shores of all
three channels of the Danish Straits belonged to the Kingdom
of Denmark. Denmark unilaterally controlled passages through
the straits and collected tolls from transiting ships. The
Baltic states were in a constant state of unrest over restric-
tions to the passage of their ships and attempted to force
changes to the regime.
In 1658, Sweden won the eastern shore of The Sound and
established her present boundary in the strait area. Sweden
secured free passage for her ships by force. Continued
pressure and negotiations by Baltic States forced changes in
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries which
considerably modified the legal position of the Danish
Straits
.
The current regime of the Danish Straits is regulated
by the Treaty of Copenhagen which was agreed to in 1857 and
is still in force. (1:135) For monetary consideration,
Denmark agreed to abolish all toils and permit duty-free
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movement of ships of all nations through the straits. But
the Treaty of Copenhagen settled the problems of merchant
shipping through the straits, it did not deal with passage
of warships. In fact there was no practical limitation on
the passage of warships until 1951. Before 1951, the price
for warships to transit the straits was friendship with the
Danish State or overwhelming naval power. The only attempts
at preventing foreign warships from transiting the Danish
Straits were treaties among certain Baltic States in 1658,
1759, 1781, 1800, and 1920 which declared the Baltic Sea to
be a closed sea and which would prevent warships of non-
Baltic nations from exercising freedom of navigation in the
Baltic enclosure. The closed sea concept of the Baltic Sea
is not recognized in current internationax j.aw.
In 1951 a Royal Edict was handed down in Denmark which
established the policy for presence of foreign warships and
military aircraft in Danish territory during peacetime.
(Appendix F) The following restrictions were imposed:
Little Belt - notification through diplomatic channels
eight days in advance of proposed passage.
Great Belt - free passage except that notification must
be given through diplomatic channels eight days in advance
if presence in the straits will exceed 48 hours and that .
permiss ion must be obtained from Danish authorities through
diplomatic channels if more than three warships of the same
nationality expect to be in the same area of the straits
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simultaneously or if any number of ships expect to be in the
straits more than four days.
The Sound - navigation in Danish waters is regulated
the same as Great Belt with the additional restriction that
notification through diplomatic channels must be given eight
4 days in advance of passage through Copenhagen Roads. Free
passage is granted in Swedish waters as long as ships do not
stop or drop anchor. (See Appendix G)
Submarines must transit any of the three channels sur-
faced and with their naval flags showing.
NATO members, during joint military maneuvers, are regu-
lated on a case-by-case basis by the Danish Ministry of
Defense according to the nature and purpose of the maneuvers
C. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS
The Soviet Navy uses the Danish Straits for the transit
of naval warships and submarines from the Baltic Sea to the
Atlantic Ocean. These ships are units of the Soviet Baltic
Sea Fleet which mainly consists of diesel submarines, anti-
submarine warfare ships, amphibious ships, and mine warfare
ships. (25:131-135)
The regime of the Danish Straits has been a factor in
determining the composition and the deployment of the Baltic
Sea Fleet. The Baltic Fleet has a short-range mission
because of the navigational restrictions imposed on warships
transiting the straits and because of the proximity of the
Northern Fleet. The limitation to surface ship transits and
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the requirement that submarines transit the straits on the
surface, as well as the fact that the North Sea port of
Murmansk is the Soviet Union's only port which remains ice-
free year round, have caused the Soviet Navy to station its
main offensive Atlantic deploying ships in the Murmansk area
(North Fleet) while it has decreased both the size and
mission of its Baltic Sea Fleet.
The Baltic Fleet is now limited to the types of ships
and submarines required for operations in the immediate vicin
ity of the Baltic Sea. Ships from the Baltic may venture
into the North Sea and the northern Atlantic Ocean but the
deployment would probably be for accomplishing a Baltic
related mission. The types of ships in the Baltic Fleet
.
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coast of the Baltic littoral with possible use along the
North Sea and Norwegian Sea coastlines, especially for
amphibious forces, if Denmark aid Sweden do not object to the
passage of Soviet warships enroute to an offensive mission.
Friendly nations bordering the Danish Straits are necessary
if Soviet ships are to use the Straits militarily because
the Straits are relatively easy to close by mining.
The limited access of the Soviet Baltic Fleet to the
open oceans has caused Soviet planners to limit the types
of ships in the Baltic Fleet to those ship types which are
required for military uses in or near the Baltic Sea.
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D. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS RELATED TO SOVIET NAVAL MISSIONS
1. Strategic Mission
There are no strategic forces in the Baltic Fleet.
(25:131) Submarines have no submerged means of egress from
the Baltic Sea and, therefore, the requirement for ballistic
missile-firing submarines to remain unlocated would be
difficult to achieve. Western forces could gain great advan
tage by watching the exits from the Baltic Sea and tracking
any submarine emerging enroute to its patrol area.
Because of the problem of the Danish Straits, sub-
marines performing a strategic mission in the Atlantic
Ocean deploy from the North Fleet. The difference in the
distances travelled exiting the two fleet areas is insigni-
ficant. The development of the Yankee-class submarine pre-
duced the first major Soviet strategic submarine threat.
At about the same time as the introduction of the Yankee-
class submarine, the Soviet Union was making some major
fleet changes. It was cutting back on the quantity and
quality of ships in the Baltic Fleet and was building up
the Northern Fleet. This indicates that the Soviet Union
considers the problem of winter icing and the problem of
transiting the Danish Straits to be serious enough to cause
a major shift. The regime of the Danish Straits prevents
surreptitious exit by submarines from the Baltic Sea and
has contributed to the problems which have caused the Soviet
Union to shift much of its Baltic Sea Fleet and all of its
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Atlantic deploying ballistic-missile-firing submarines to
the North Sea Fleet.
2 . Defense of Homeland
The main military mission left to the Baltic Fleet
is defense of the homeland. To accomplish this mission, the
Soviet Navy requires transits of the Danish Straits. The
Soviet Union is the strongest Baltic naval power and has
little to fear from a naval attack by another Baltic
power. The Soviet Union also has little to fear from a non-
Baltic naval power penetrating into Baltic waters because of
the problem of limited access routes. By the time a non-
Baltic naval power entered the Baltic Sea, the naval war
would have been nearly lost by the Soviet Union. The Baltic
Fleet would then be used to assist in the defense of Baltic
ports
.
Nevertheless, the Baltic navy also has the capability
of performing an offensive role. By transiting the Danish
Straits, the Baltic Fleet ships can join ships of the North
Fleet in meeting a naval force approaching the Soviet Union.
Baltic Fleet ships can contribute to defense of the homeland
by performing in antiship and antisubmarine roles in the
North Sea and in the northern Atlantic Ocean. The Soviet
Navy might transit the Danish Straits to initiate an amphi-
bious attack against coastlines in the North or Norwegian
Seas. The Soviet Baltic Fleet amphibious capability has
grown. A scenario in which Soviet amphibious warfare ships
from the Baltic Fleet have attacked outside the Baltic has
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been demonstrated in Soviet fleet exercises. If Baltic
Fleet ships were needed in these roles, the Soviet Navy
would probably disregard the regime of the Danish Straits
and sail as many ships as might be required and without
notice. This move could be excused on the part of the Soviet
Union as an act in time of emergency and a diplomatic note
to that effect might be transmitted to the Danish and
Swedish governments in mitigation of the act.
3 . Naval Presence
Possibly one of the most important roles the Soviet
Navy is playing in the Baltic Sea is that of maintaining
Soviet presence. Keeping the Baltic free of Soviet enemies
is important to the Soviet government. This is evidenced in
the Soviet effort to proclaim the Baltic a closed sea which
would prevent non-Baltic warships from entering the Baltic
Sea.
As the most powerful naval force in the Baltic, the
Soviet Navy is ensuring that other Baltic nations remain on
good terms with the Soviet Union. Even though the Baltic
is not recognized as a closed sea, the Soviets have the
capability of militarily controlling any Baltic activity.
For this purpose, the Soviet Navy maintains strong amphibious
and mine warfare forces in the Baltic Fleet.
The Danish Straits limit the capability of the
Soviet Navy to deploy out of the Baltic in support of Soviet
naval objectives but the navigational restriction applies
equally to non-Baltic nations, with relaxations only during
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NATO maneuvers, and limits their capability to perform
military missions in the Baltic Sea. Because of the Danish
Straits, the Soviet Union is able to effectively treat the
Baltic as a closed sea by application of its naval presence
even though international law does not recognize the Baltic
Sea as being closed.
4. Protection of Economic Interests
Baltic ports bound the northwestern section of the
Soviet Union's greatest industrial area. For this reason,
the ability to use Baltic ports as terminals for international
shipping is important to the Soviet Union. The Danish
Straits are the only natural shipping channels between the
Baltic Sea and the open ocean and they are the only channels
through which merchant shipping has legally and traditionally
been granted free passage. The Soviet Union needs passage
of merchant shipping through the Danish Straits in order to
ensure the flow of shipping to and from its industrial
Baltic ports.
Maintenance of a strong naval force in the Baltic
Sea gives the Soviet Union a strong bargaining position.
In the unlikely event that the regime of the Danish Straits
should change and that merchant ship transits of the Danish
Straits should be imperiled, the Soviet Navy is in a posi-
tion to further the economic interests of the Soviet Union





There are two routes between the Baltic Sea and open
ocean that could be used in lieu of the Danish Straits. The
first route is the internal waterways between the Baltic Sea
and the White Sea or Black Sea and the second route is the
Kiel Canal.
Inland waterways would be an unsatisfactory alternative
for the transit of naval vessels from the Baltic Sea to the
open ocean. Although passage is guaranteed by enclosure of
the waterways within Soviet territory, transit of large ships
would not be possible, transits would be time-consuming
enough to make this a poor method of reacting to a tactical
threat, and transits through inland waterways would be a
tedious means of deploying. The Baltic- White Sea Canal
stretches 141 miles between Leningrad and Byelomorsk while
a journey from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea would be a
longer route through natural rivers and lakes. If ships home
ported in the Baltic Fleet were expected to deploy to open
ocean areas, closure of the Danish Straits would prompt the
transfer of most Baltic Fleet ships to other home ports,
probably in the North Fleet, which would be a much simpler
solution to the problem than deploying through inland water-
ways. If the Danish Straits were closed to the passage of
warships, the defensive problems of the Soviet Union would
be simplified and they would probably be satisfied with an
even smaller naval force in the Baltic Sea. Inland waterways
might be satisfactory only as a means for inter-fleet trans-
fers of small ships.
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The Kiel Canal, in northwest Germany, was built between
1887 and 1895 to facilitate shifting the German fleet between
the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. It connects the North
Sea with the Baltic Sea between Burnsbuttelkoog and the Kiel
suburb of Holtenau. The canal is sixty-one miles long,
thirty-seven feet deep, and has a surface width of three
hundred thirty-eight feet. The Kiel Canal is of sufficient
size to permit the passage of any ship of the Soviet Baltic
Fleet. (1:179-181)
The Kiel Canal is the best of all routes between the
Baltic S.ea and the open ocean. Its only drawbacks are the
requirement to pay a toll for passage and its control by the
West German Government (Federal Republic of Germany) . The
advantages are, first, that the roulfc is safer than natural
passages because of regulation and maintenance and, second,
that the journey through the Kiel Canal is about 250 miles
shorter than the trip through the Danish Straits.
If the Soviet Union were in control of the Kiel Canal,
the alternative route might be more than satisfactory; it
might be preferred. Passage of warships through the Kiel
Canal, however, is subject to permission of the West German
Government obtained through diplomatic channels. The Soviet
Union cannot be assured of permission for her warships to
transit the Kiel Canal and, therefore, must consider the
Danish Straits to be the primary route between the Baltic
Sea and open oceans.
52

F. POSSIBLE REGIMES FOR THE DANISH STRAITS
Since all routes of the Danish Straits are enclosed
within territorial waters and since the regime of the Danish
Straits has been established in international law and inter-
national custom, the likelihood that the regime of the Danish
Straits will change is small. All nations have accustomed
themselves to the current regime. That is demonstrated by
the fact that the Soviet Union, the nation with the most to
lose by restrictions to transits of the Danish Staits, has
accepted the current regime, with the exception of objecting
to NATO members being permitted to exercise in the Baltic,
and has adapted its policies and actions to accomodate the
regime. (1:134-138) Nevertheless, the possibility exists
that Sweden and Denmark, or Denmark unilaterally, might, in
time of international tension or under threat of imminent
violence, close the Danish Straits to passage of warships.
A less serious and more probable revision to the regime of
the Danish Straits is that either or both of the nations
controlling the straits might decide to require prior notice
for any transit of warships through the straits.
There is no reason for the regime of the Danish Straits
to be changed in any other manner. A relaxation of the
regulations concerning passage of warships would be a relin-
quishment of the power of a coastal state which is not
required by international law nor which is a normally agree-
able concession by any sovereign nation.
c 3

A change from the granting of innocent passage for mer-
chant shipping would gain nothing for either Denmark or
Sweden. The change would be contrary to present international
law so that restriction of merchant ship transits would be
condemned by world opinion. It would be contrary to the
normal interest of nations, such as Denmark and Sweden, who
have a national stake in seaborne commerce and must rely on
ocean access for their own merchant ships. Any such restric-
tive action would be a dangerous precedent which might be
used later to the disadvantage of Denmark and Sweden. The
move would be futile because merchant ships would still have
the convenient route of the Kiel Canal available to them.
A possibility for a change to the regime of the Danish
Straits is that further restrictions might be placed on the
passage of warships. This move might make Denmark, Sweden,
and the remaining Baltic powers, especially the Soviet
Union, feel more secure. A prime consideration in postulat-
ing a change to the regime of the Baltic Sea is that, before
joining NATO in 1949, Denmark had always leaned toward the
strongest Baltic power. NATO gave Denmark the chance to
break with historical inevitability but a weakening NATO
could make it difficult for Denmark to hold against the aims
of a strong power in the Baltic. (18:12-13)
G. SOVIET REACTION
If further restrictions were to be placed on the transit
of warships through the Danish Straits, the Soviet Union
54

would accommodate its naval policies. to the new restriction.
The Soviet government supports regulations requiring
advance notice for transit of warships through straits.
That requirement might be considered legitimate and should
be complied with by the Soviet Union. (1:23)
At first glance, closure of the Danish Straits to the
passage of warships might be thought to destroy the Baltic
Fleet's capability of performing its missions. Transit of
Soviet warships through the Danish Straits, however, is not
necessary for the Soviet Union's navy to accomplish missions
which might just as well be accomplished by the newer and
more powerful Soviet ships from the North Fleet. The Soviet
Union has revised the composition of the Baltic naval force
so that its mission is conducted almost totally within the
confines of the Baltic Sea and, at the same time, built up
the North Fleet to accomplish the missions required in the
Atlantic theater of operations.
The Soviet Union is now using naval power to make the
Baltic Sea a nearly closed sea because of their military
prevalence in the area. Instead of objecting to closure of
the Danish Staits to transits of warships, the Soviet Union
might welcome the act as the final step toward creating a
closed sea in the Baltic without the necessity of inter-




IV. THE TURKISH STRAITS
A. DESCRIPTION
The Turkish Straits include the Bosporus, the Sea of
Marmara, and the Dandanelles. They connect the Black Sea
with the Mediterranean Sea which then permits access to the
Atlantic Ocean through the Straits of Gibraltar and to the
Red Sea and Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal. The straits
separate European from Asiatic Turkey. The trip through the
Straits is a journey of about 190 miles.
1. The Bosporus
The Bosporus joins the Black Sea with the Sea of
Marmara. Its name is from the legend of Io. According to
the legend, Zeus turned Io into a cow to protect her from
Hera while Io was. fleeing from Thrace to Egypt. Disguised
as a cow, Io swam the Bosporus and the Strait was named
Bus Poros which means "cow-ford."
The Bosporus is seventeen miles long and varies in
width from 650 yards at its narrowest point to 3,600 yards
at its widest. The average depth of the Bosporus is 165 to
230 feet while its maximum depth is about 400 feet. The
current in the Strait forms treacherous whirlpools in
several places and has been called "the Devil's Current."
Easterly and northerly gales hazard navigation at the Black




The Sea of Marmara
The Sea of Marmara lies between the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles. Istanbul is on its northeastern shore at the
entrance to the Bosporus. Its greatest length is about 170
miles but ships transiting between the Bosporus and Dardan-
elles require a journey of only 115 miles. The greatest depth
in the Sea of Marmara is 4,500 feet and its greatest width
is nearly 50 miles. The sea gets its name from Marmara
Island which lies in its western section. Princes Islands
lie in the eastern section near Istanbul.
3. The Dardanelles
The Dardanelles is the strait connecting the Sea
of Marmara to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. It
wab called Hellespont in the classical age after Helle who,
in mythology, drowned in its waters while fleeing with the
golden fleece. The modern name, Dardanelles, is from the
town of Dardanos, now named Ilium, which was ancient Troy
and which was near the southern shore of the Straits.
Originally, the name was applied not to the Strait but to
the fortifications along the shores which accounts for its
plural form.
The Dardanelles is about forty miles in length.
Gallipoli is the only town of significance in this distance.
The width of the Strait varies from 1,400 to 6,850 yards
and its depth varies from 150 to 350 feet. At the narrowest





five knots which makes navigation hazardous, especially in
the presence of cross winds.
B. REGIME OF THE TURKISH STRAITS
The problem of regulating the Turkish Straits can be
traced as far back as the Trojan Wars in the twelfth century
B.C. when Troy controlled the Straits and Greek ships used
the Straits for importing grain from the fertile areas around
the Black Sea littoral. Modern history, though, should
begin with the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaimardj i between Russia and
the Ottoman Empire in 1774 in which Russia obtained the
right for her commercial vessels to transit the Turkish
Straits. That treaty was the wedge which, in ensuing years,
opened the straits to merchant vessels of al! nations.
Warships were another matter. In 1805, Russia and the
Ottoman Empire agreed that the Black Sea was a closed sea
and that warships of all powers would be denied transit of
the Turkish Straits. The agreement specifically stated the
understanding that Russian warships were to have free passage
of the Straits. This was necessary for Russia to participate
in defense of the Straits against foreign warships.
The spirit of the agreement concerning merchant ships
was reaffirmed in treaties and conventions between the
Ottoman Empire and many seafaring nations during the nine-
teenth century. The position on warships, however, changed
as opportunity and threat changed. In 1841, the position
on warships was moderated to exclude foreign warships from
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the Black Sea only so long as Turkey was at peace. Then, in
1856, to conclude the Crimean War an agreement was made
.between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia,
Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire stating that the Black Sea
was neutral. The agreement allowed freedom of commerce in
the Black Sea but excluded all foreign warships, allowed no
military-maritime arsenals on the Black Sea coasts, and allowed
Russia and the Ottoman Empire only a few Black Sea naval
vessels for policing the treaty. The Black Sea was a
demilitarized area.
Russia fought the Crimean War for, among other things,
control of the Turkish Straits. The 1850 agreement limited
the Russian naval capability in one of the few areas where
Russia had access to the oceans and an area where one of
Russia's strongest fleets had been based.* Turkey considered
the Russian limitation necessary for maintenance of Turkish
security. The Black Sea remained neutral for nearly fifteen
years but, in 1870, Russia disavowed the 1856 treaty and
resumed naval operations in the Black Sea and through the
Turkish Straits.
The regime of the Turkish Straits remained relatively
stable until the twentieth century when the two world wars
caused major changes to be made both to the regime of the
*
The Pacific Fleet was established in 1932 and the North-
ern Fleet was established in 1933. In 1856, Russia's access
to open ocean was by exiting the Black Sea through the Turk-





Turkish Straits and to the militarization of the Black
Sea. The twentieth century has seen three treaties regulat-
ing the Straits -- The Convention of Sevres, August 10, 1920,
The Convention of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, and the Convention
of Montreux, July 20, 1936.
The Sevres Convention would have opened the Turkish
Straits to every commercial or military ship or aircraft but
the convention never entered into force. The Lausanne Con-
vention was part of the World War I peace settlement. It
regulated passage of and demilitarized the Straits. It
allowed transit of both merchant and military ships. The
Lausanne Convention lasted until the world-wide political
situation caused Turkey to doubt the security provided by
the Lausanne Convention which relied on the support of League
of Nations members for defense. While the Germans rearmed
and denounced their treaties, the Turks called for a revision
of the convention regulating the Turkish Straits. This re-
vision produced the Montreux Convention which omitted the
demilitarization required by the Lausanne Convention and
allowed the Turkish Government to halt the passage of war-
ships when Turkey would be threatened or at war. The
Montreux convention is still in force today.
The following are the general provisions of the Montreux
Convention. (See Appendix H)
1 . Merchant Ships
In time of peace or in time of war when Turkey is
not a belligerent, merchant ships have complete freedom of
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navigation in the Turkish Straits. When Turkey is threatened
by war, merchant ships are still granted free passage of the
Straits but they may enter the Straits only during daylight
hours and must follow the route indicated by Turkish
authorities
.
2 . Surface Warships
During peacetime, light surface vessels, minor war-
ships, and auxiliaries of any flag have freedom of transit
through the Turkish Straits. Black Sea powers may send
ships larger than 15,000 tons through the Straits if they
pass singly and are escorted by no more than two destroyers.
This tonnage limitation applies to the Soviet MOSKVA Class
Helicopter Missile Cruisers and the SVERDLOV Class Cruisers
based in the Black Sea. It will apply to the Kiev Class
Aircraft Carrier now being built in the Black Sea. Non-Black
Sea powers may not have a ship larger than 15,000 tons nor
more than a total of nine ships in the Black Sea at one time.
The tonnage limitations would apply to the ALBANY Class
Guided Missile Cruiser and larger ships of the United States
Navy. The limits do not apply to ships paying courtesy
visits at the invitation of the Turkish Government. Notifi-
cation of intended passage of any warship is required eight
days in advance for Black Sea powers and fifteen days in
advance for non-Black Sea powers.
During time of war when Turkey is neutral or non-
belligerent, peacetime rules apply to warships of non-
belligerents. Warships belonging to belligerents may not
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pass the Straits except to render assistance to victims of
aggression who have a mutual assistance agreement with
Turkey. Warships separated from their home bases by the
Turkish Straits at the time of outbreak of hostilities are
permitted to pass the Straits to return to their home
bases
.
When Turkey is threatened by war, she may deny
passage of warships at her discretion. Warships which
transited the Straits before determination of a threat are
permitted to return to their bases but Turkey may deny that
right to warships belonging to a state which caused Turkey
to perceive the threat.
In time of war when Turkey is a belligerent, pass-
age of warships through the Straits is entirely at the dis-
cretion of the Turkish Government.
3. Submarines
Non-Black Sea powers are not authorized to send sub
marines through the Straits for any reason. Black Sea
powers may send submarines through the Straits if they were
constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea and require
transit of the Straits in order to join their bases.
Submarines belonging to Black Sea powers are also permitted
to transit the Turkish Straits if they require repair in
shipyards outside the Black Sea. In both cases, adequate






Civil aircraft are permitted to fly over the Turkish
Straits so long as they provide advance notification of their
overflight and they remain within air corridors established
by the Turkish Government. Warships, however, are not per-
mitted to operate aircraft while transiting the Turkish
Straits. In fact the Montreux Convention makes no provision
for allowing overflight of any military aircraft. In addi-
tion, the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone does not grant innocent passage to
aircraft which means there is no law under which military
aircraft can legally transit or operate in the air space over
the Turkish Straits. Passage of military aircraft through
the air space over the Turkish Straits, then, is entirely at
the discretion of the Turkish Government.
5. General Limitations
Aggregate tonnage of warships in the Black Sea belong-
ing to non-Black Sea powers may not exceed 30,000 tons in
time of peace while tonnage of any one non-Black sea power
may not exceed 20,000 tons. If the Soviet fleet is incre-
ased by at least 10,000 tons over its tonnage at the time of
signing of the Montreux Convention, the aggregate tonnage
for non-Black Sea powers may be increased to 45,000 tons and
the maximum tonnage allowed any one non-Black Sea power may
be increased to 30,000 tons. The 10,000 ton increase has
been reached by the Soviet Navy.
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Provision is also made for a limited non-Black Sea
force to enter the Black Sea for humanitarian purposes.
Regardless of the reasons for presence, warships of
non-Black Sea powers may not remain in the Black Sea longer
than twenty-one days.
6 . Duration
The Montreux Convention was designed to last twenty
years. It could be amended or revised at the end of each
five-year period by initiation of a proposal by any signatory
Signatories to the convention were Bulgaria, France, Great
Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, U.S.S.R., and
Yugoslavia. The treaty will last in perpetuity, even after
its intended twenty years, until any signatory gives a two-
year advance notice of intention to denounce the treaty. All
signatories agreed to hold a conference for arriving at a
new convention if notice of denunciation of the Montreux
Convention would be given.
The Montreux Convention has survived to the present
without denunciation and with only minor revision even
though some of its provisions and its language are obsolete.
Regardless of the list of signatories and provi-
sions for their denouncing or changing the Montreux Conven-
tion, the regulations governing passage of ships through
the Turkish Straits appear to have entered the realm of a
customary legal regime. As such, they apply to all nations
whether they were signatories to the convention or not. In
addition, since the regime of the Straits falls under
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customary law, the power to change the convention is not
necessarily limited to signatories to the convention. This
was illustrated as early as 1945 when, at Potsdam, the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union endeavored to
achieve a modernization of the regime of the Turkish Straits.
The "customary legal regime" of the Turkish Straits
is internationally recognized as binding to non-signatory as
well as signatory powers. Even if denounced, the regime of
the Straits would undoubtedly remain as recognized law until
some international agreement could be reached which would
regulate the Turkish Straits.
C. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS
The Soviet Navy's ships transit the Turkish Straits into
the Mediterranean Sea to support its largest out-of-area
commitment. After the Suez Canal is reopened, the importance
of the Turkish Straits might grow because the Soviet Black
Sea force also could be used to support the Soviet commitment
in the Indian Ocean.
The regime of the Turkish Straits affects the composi-
tion of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and its mission capabil-
ity. The reason that a relatively small number of submarines
is home ported in the Black Sea and that most of them are
conventional medium-range attack submarines is that sub-
marines are generally not permitted to transit the Turkish
Straits. (34:26) This means that the Soviet Navy cannot
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support a Mediterranean Sea commitment with submarines
from its Black Sea Fleet and that submarines based there
are intended for use in the Black Sea.
The requirement for advance notice of passage through
the Straits means that it is never a surprise when Soviet
navy ships leave the Black Sea. The Soviets may falsely
indicate intended transits in order to give an erroneous
impression of an intended Mediterranean build-up but, still,
any real build-up is announced by the requirement for
advance notification.
The limitation on the transit of ships over 15,000 tons
is only a minor impediment that should not prove detrimental
under normal circumstances. Only a few ships larger than
15,000 tons are based in the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and they
would not normally deploy together.
Effects of the regime of the Turkish Straits are clearly
seen in the composition of the Black Sea Fleet. While it
is convenient for the Soviet Union to support its Mediter-
ranean Sea commitment by deploying ships from the Black Sea,
limitations to transit of warships has been an obvious factor
in causing the Soviet Navy to decrease the size of the Black
Sea Fleet, limit its Black Sea submarine force, and maintain
a majority of general purpose forces in the Black Sea.
Although some Soviet naval ships have transited the
Turkish Straits to participate in major fleet exercises as
far from the Black Sea as the northern Atlantic Ocean,
Soviet warships generally transit the Turkish Straits for
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the purpose of maintaining a naval force in the Mediterran-
ean. Naval ships from the Black Sea may be expected to
augment the Indian Ocean forces after the Suez Canal is
reopened.
D. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS RELATED TO SOVIET NAVAL MISSIONS
1. Strategic Mission
Soviet strategic forces are not permitted to use
the Turkish Straits because of the ban on transits of sub-
marines imposed by the Montreux Convention. Even if Soviet
submarines were granted authority to use the Straits or if
they were able to transit the Straits surreptitiously,
Soviet submarines would present a relatively simple detection
problem either upon their exit from the Turkish Straits or
upon their exit from the Mediterranean if they were to ven-
ture into the Atlantic or the Indian Oceans.
Because of the legal and physical restrictions to
submarines transiting the Turkish Straits, the Soviet Navy
does not maintain strategic submarine forces in the Black
Sea. (25:131) The Straits make a Black Sea strategic sub-
marine force impractical and, in recognition of this fact,
the Soviet Union has stationed its strategic submarines in




Defense of the Homeland
Defense of the homeland is probably the main military
mission of the Soviet Black Sea naval forces transiting the
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Turkish Straits. After World War II, the Soviet Union
developed its Black Sea fleet but kept its ships within
the boundaries of the Black Sea to protect that area of
its territory. An interest of the Soviet Union in the Turk-
ish Straits was to devise a treaty which would ensure
foreign powers would be restrained from threatening Soviet
supremacy in the Black Sea. The United States, meanwhile,
was providing naval forces to NATO which were stationed in
the Mediterranean Sea. With the advent of carrier-based
aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons in the late
50 ? s and with the introduction of strategic ballistic-missile
firing submarines into the Mediterranean in the early 60'
s
the Soviet Union perceived a naval threat to their terri-
torial area which was not combated by their force stationed
in the Black Sea. The Soviet Union determined the necessity
for deploying ships into the Mediterranean in order to
combat the threat of United States carrier task groups and
@ballistic-missile-firing nuclear submarines. For this
purpose, their Black Sea Fleet was ideal except that they
The statement that the Soviet Union deployed naval ships
into the Mediterranean in a defensive posture is controversial
in that an opposing opinion states the action was offensive
and designed as an instrument of Soviet policy. That opinion
holds the Soviet Navy deployed into the Mediterranean as an
ambassador to extend Soviet authority, to demonstrate Soviet
technology, to protect Soviet shipping, to support Soviet
allies, and to show Soviet strength. While these uses for
the Soviet Navy are evident, the position taken in this paper
is that the primary mission of the Soviet Navy was defensive
and that the advantages of Soviet naval presence were
ancillary. This position is based on Soviet history and the
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were unable to send their attack submarines through the
Turkish Straits. Therefore, the Soviet Union uses the Turkish
Straits to send defensive surface forces from the Black Sea
into the Mediterranean Sea to combat the threat to the Soviet
homeland they perceive in the Mediterranean. Soviet sub-
marines which combat United States aircraft carriers and
submarines are forced to transit from the North Fleet or
the Baltic Fleet and enter the Mediterranean Sea through the
Strait of Gibraltar.
sequence of events in the Mediterranean.
The Soviet Union was, historically, a land power which
used its army as an instrument of influence and its navy to
defend its coasts. The Soviet, move into the Mediterranean
was the first Soviet naval deployment and came only after
the United States Navy became a long range threat to the
Soviet homeland. (22:5)
Throughout history, Russia refused to annex territory
which would depend on seapower for support. They retreated
from California, declined to annex Hawaii, and sold Alaska
to the United States. (35:66-69) These actions are unchar-
acteristic of a power which had always endeavored to increase
its territory and might be attributed to the possibility
that Russia did not have the navy nor did it intend to build
a navy which could support Russian interest across seas or
oceans
.
The Soviet Navy was generally kept within the Baltic Sea
and the Black Sea until the 1930 f s when naval ships were
based in the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. Those
basing actions could be attributed to the necessity for de-
fending an expanding Soviet Union whose borders had reached
the V/hite Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
After World War II, the Soviet Navy was ill prepared to
deploy offensively because of the damage inflicted by Germany
Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy received relatively high
priority and was rebuilt. The first protracted continuous
deployment of Soviet naval forces was made into the Mediter-
ranean in 1964. This was the remote area of most immediate
threat to the Soviet homeland and could be interpreted to




The Soviet naval deployment into the Mediterranean
was a defensive move but it provided the Soviet Union with
a collateral benefit. The Soviet naval presence in the
Mediterranean brought new prestige to the Soviet Government.
Previously, the United States, as the dominant power, had
its own way in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union had
followed its traditional method of expanding its influence
by increasing the depth of its layer of buffer states
around its perimeter while the United States had extended
its influence throughout the world. When the Soviet Navy
entered the Mediterranean, it found it not only served the
defense of the Soviet Union but that it also was an instru-
ment of spreading Soviet influence. The Soviet Union must
have learned that, as the Soviet Navy gained influence for
the Soviet Union, the influence of the United States
decreased.
The Soviet Navy, in the early years of Mediterranean
deployments, limited its operations to the eastern Mediter-
ranean. In recent years, it has expanded its operations into
the western Mediterranean where it has been especially
active in the area of North Africa.
The Soviet Navy has increased its operations in the
Mediterranean Sea from 4,000 ship days in 1965 to 18,000
ship days in 1972. (2:13) Submarines patrol the entire area.
Surface ships patrol near Gibraltar, south of Sicily,
between Crete and Greece, and from Egypt to Turkey along the
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borders of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. These surface war-
ships can be seen transiting throughout the Mediterranean.
Intelligence collecting ships can be found in the areas of
tactical interest throughout the Mediterranean and in company
with United States naval ships during maneuvers. (23:28)
Soviet naval ships visit ports in every African nation bor-
dering the Mediterranean, in Syria, Greece, Yugoslavia,
Italy, and Spain. In addition, the Soviet Navy uses
established anchorages in the Mediterranean for staging and
logistics
.
The Soviet Union has made its presence felt in the
Mediterranean. It has attained a position of power and
high status. Soviet achievements in the Mediterranean have
been the result of the deployment of naval ships from the
Black Sea through the Turkish Straits.
4 . Protection of Economic Interests
The southern section of the Soviet industrial area
borders on the Black Sea. Soviet merchant shipping must
have access to Black Sea ports and must be able to range
from Black Sea ports to areas with which they engage in
international trade or support. The Turkish Straits make
up the only channel by which merchant ships from outside the
Black Sea can communicate with Black Sea ports and the only
channel by which Soviet merchant ships can exit the Black
Sea. The Soviet Union requires passage of the Turkish Straits
for its merchant ships in order to maintain seaborne trade




By maintaining a naval force in the area of the
Turkish Staits, the Soviet Union is ensuring that it has a
strong bargaining position concerning activities in that
area. Historical precedent would indicate that the likeli-
hood of the Turkish Government restricting the passage of
merchant shipping through the Turkish Straits is slim.
Nevertheless, should some future conflict threaten the
ability of the Soviet Union to maintain its flow of commerce
to its industrial area because of closure of the Turkish
Straits, the Soviet Navy is in position to represent the
economic interest of the Soviet Union by forcing the right
of merchant ships to transit the Turkish Straits.
E. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
The only practical route for Soviet shipping to enter or
exit the Black Sea is by way of the Turkish Straits. There
is no passage through which ships may transit from the Black
Sea into the Mediterranean Sea by way of canal or any
natural waterway other than the Turkish Straits. There is
a series of inland waterways through which ships may pass
from the Black Sea to either the Baltic Sea or the White
Sea and then to open ocean areas. While passage through the
inland waterways is guaranteed, it is available only to
smaller ships, is a tedious and time consuming trip, and
leaves Black Sea ships far from a Mediterranean destination
with restricted waters yet ahead.
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A requirement for naval ships to transit the inland
waterways would be satisfactory for inter-fleet transfers
but would be tactically unsound. Reaction time would be
unreasonably long and, at the end of a difficult transit,
Black Fleet ships would be at the position from which other
naval ships are prepared to start a transit. Naval ships
could be more advantageously based in other ports rather
than being based in an area where deployment would be so
difficult. The Mediterranean commitment would be made more
difficult to maintain if Soviet naval ships were required
to use the system of inland waterways to exit the Black
Sea.
A requirement for merchant ships to use the system of
inland waterways would be equally unsatisfactory. Large
ships would be physically prohibited and even small ships
would not be as satisfactory as simple barges for carrying
commerce through the network of waterways. The inland
waterways would be useful only for facilitating the trans-
port of materials from the Black Sea to inland ports.
Other alternate routes for achieving the Soviet Navy's
mission in the Mediterranean would be to use the Strait of
Gibraltar or the Suez Canal for ships entering the Mediter-
ranean. This alternative would not solve the problem of •
permitting ships to transit into or out of the Black Sea
but it provides routes by which the Soviet Navy could send
ships into the Mediterranean from other fleet areas to
accomplish the mission of a bottled-up Black Sea Fleet. It
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would be completely unsatisfactory for merchant ships requir-
ing access to Black Sea ports or requiring egress from the
Black Sea.
The feasibility of Soviet naval or merchant ships using
any route other than the Turkish Straits to deploy to or
from the Black Sea is not likely. Supplying naval ships for
the Mediterranean Sea commitment from other fleets through
the Suez Canal or Strait of Gibraltar is possible but incon-
venient and it would tax the capability of other fleets to
perform their present missions.
F. POSSIBLE REGIMES FOR THE TURKISH STRAITS
The Montreux Convention has proved to be a very stable
set of regulations for controlling the Turkish Straits. The
probable reasons for its stability are that all signatory
powers have adjusted to the balance it mandates and that no
power will agree to a change which might give an advantage
to some other power. Non-Black Sea powers with strong
navies would probably like relaxations to regulations restric-
ting passages of their ships through the Turkish Straits
but not at the price of relaxing regulations restricting
passage of Soviet ships and submarines out of the Black Sea.
The Soviet Union might prefer relaxation of regulations
restricting passage of Soviet naval ships and, especially,
submarines through the Turkish Straits but not at the price
of relaxing the restrictions to non-Black Sea powers' warships
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entering the Black Sea. The possibility of arriving at a
more unfavorable regime has probably been the factor which
has prevented any major change in the Montreux Convention
at the behest of any major power and has prevented any signa-
tory power from giving the two year notice of intent to
denounce the treaty which would be required for terminating
the provisions of the Montreux Convention or for convening
a conference for concluding a new convention. The Montreux
Convention remained effective after its twenty-year intended
duration and, if left to the whims or intentions of signatory
or other world powers, it will probably remain in effect to
regulate transits of the Turkish Straits for the foreseeable
future
.
There are two possibilities of changes which would
affect the regime of the Turkish Straits. The first is that
the Turkish government might unilaterally proclaim that it
would no longer abide by the Montreux Convention and that
passage of foreign ships through the Turkish Straits would
$ If submarines were permitted to transit the Turkish
Straits, the Soviet Navy could support its Mediterranean
commitment with submarines from the Black Sea fleet. ile
the submarines would be required to transit on the surface
and would be detected entering the Mediterranean, Soviet sub'
marines are required to pass through restricted waters at
Gibraltar or Suez if entering the Mediterranean by another
route. The shorter trip would probably be worth the added
probability of detection.
For example, the world's strongest powers were not able
to effect any change to the Montreux Convention as part of
the peace settlement of V.'orld War II even after agreeing at
Potsdam that the Convention needed to be changed.
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be at the pleasure of the Turkish Government. The probabil-
ity of this occurrence is slim because, although it would
give the Turkish Government a stronger bargaining position
when dealing with other States, the Montreux Convention has
entered into the realm of customary law and any unilateral
change on the part of the Turkish Government would undoubt-
edly meet with disapproval by other nations and, probably,
political and economic sanctions against Turkey so long as
the unpopular position would be maintained.
The Turkish Government does not need additional regula-
tion for security. The Montreux Convention already provides
for control of all ships transiting the Straits should
Turkey be at war or be threatened by war. That should be
sufficient protection for the Turkish nation. Any unilateral
act of unwarranted restriction to passage of warships through
the Straits would probably be met by resistance from other
nations who would insist on traditional rights provided by
the Montreux Convention or a new international agreement to
regulate the Straits.
Nevertheless, if the international law of the sea is
changed to give new rights to strait states which are more
restrictive than the Montreux Convention, the Turkish
Government would probably be persuaded by events to press
for like changes in the regime of the Turkish Straits. In
this case, the seafaring nations of the world, having just
established a new precedent, would have little alternative
but to accept a like regime for the Turkish Straits as they
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had established for similar straits. Then a unilateral
move by the Turkish Government to change the regime of the
Turkish Straits might appear to be legitimate.
The second occurrence which might affect the regime of
the Turkish Straits is that the Mediterranean nations might
proclaim the Mediterranean to be a "closed sea" and limit
access to the Mediterranean to warships of Mediterranean
countries. The principal of "closed seas" has been supported
by the Soviet Union and has been suggested by Greece and
Spain which are reasons that the proclamation might be a
reasonable consideration. In order for such an act to be
possible, however, all nations along the littoral of the
Mediterranean Sea would have to be in agreement and act in
harmony. This requirement nearly destroys any probability
that the Mediterranean might be declared a closed sea.
If the Mediterranean Sea were closed and put off-limits
to warships of non-Mediterranean powers, the problem of the
Turkish Straits concerning passage of warships would be
alleviated because the only ships eligible to transit the
Straits would be those of Mediterranean nations. Once the
Mediterranean had been declared "closed", the Soviet Union
could achieve an old objective of declaring the Black Sea
to be a "closed sea." After the Mediterranean and Black
Seas were declared "closed," only Turkish warships would be
eligible to transit the Turkish Straits because Turkey is
the only nation which borders on both bodies of water. The
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regime of the Turkish Straits would then be insignificant as
it concerns passage of warships.
G. SOVIET REACTION
The reaction to a change to the regime of the Turkish
Straits is a more complicated matter than it might seem at
first glance. The reaction would depend on whether a change
in the regime of the Turkish Straits would be an independent
act or whether it would be accompanied by changes in the
regimes of the other narrow waterways leading into the
Mediterranean Sea. The balance of power in the Mediterranean
is affected by naval powers entering through the Red Sea and
the Strait of Gibraltar as well as those transiting the
Turkish Straits.
If Turkey were to close the Turkish Straits to all ships
including merchant ships, the Soviet Union would negotiate,
with the assistance of other world powers, until some agree-
ment could be reached which would allow passage of merchant
ships.
If Turkey were to close the Straits to passage of warships
as a unique act, the other world powers might not come to the
side of the Soviet Union in negotiating an agreement for
passage because the act would ensure a shift in the balance
of power in the Mediterranean away from the Soviet Union.
This occurrence would be so detrimental to the interests of
the Soviet Government that the Soviet Navy could be expected
to immediately stage strong naval forces on both ends of the
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Turkish Straits and strong army forces on the Russian/Turkish
border with the expectation that the Turkish Government would
relent to threats of gunboat diplomacy and at least revert to
the provisions of the Montreux Convention. If the Turkish
Government did not relent to the threatened action, the Soviet
Government would be forced to take military action to win
the right for its xvarships to transit the Turkish Straits in
order to continue their defensive actions against United
States forces in the Mediterranean and to maintain their
power and influence in the area. The only alternative to
military action would be that the Soviet Navy might shift a
large part of its Black Sea Fleet to the North Fleet or
Baltic Fleet ports from where it could still support its
Mediterranean commitment. Nevertheless, the increased
difficulty of supporting a Mediterranean deployment from
more distant ports and sympathy of world opinion at the
Turks terminating a historic and legal right of passage by
unilateral action would probably cause the Soviet Union to
choose military action, if necessary, to enforce their right
of passage through the Turkish Straits.
On the other hand, the Soviet Government might accept
closure of the Turkish Straits to the passage of warships if
the act were also accompanied by closure of Red Sea straits
and the Strait of Gibraltar or even if it were only accom-
panied by closure of the Strait of Gibraltar even though
warships might still be permitted to enter the Mediterranean
through the Red Sea and Suez Canal.
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Prohibition of the passage of all warships into the
Mediterranean Sea could benefit the Soviet Union. If ships
of the United States Navy and of United States' Atlantic
allies were prevented from entering the Mediterranean Sea,
the Soviet Union would no longer be required to deploy into
the Mediterranean for a defensive mission against aircraft
carriers and ballistic-missile-firing submarines of the
United States Sixth Fleet. The remaining agents of influ-
ence in the Mediterranean would be merchant ships. The
Soviet Union would probably use her merchant fleet as an
instrument of influence just as it now uses its merchant
fleet in a dual role to support and assist its navy. An
advantage of this situation to the Soviet Union is that,
with the disappearance of the United States threat, require-
ments on the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would decrease to the
level where Soviet naval ships could be shifted from the
Black Sea to other fleet bases where they could be used to
augment currently constituted forces. The Soviet Union
could maintain the foremost position in the Black Sea with
many fewer ships than are presently stationed there and
still have enough ships on station in the Atlantic Ocean
and Indian Ocean as well as the Black Sea so that the
Mediterranean would be surrounded by Soviet naval ships
which could react on short notice if it were necessary for
them to enter the Mediterranean for military purposes.
If the Red Sea and Suez Canal were the only entrance for
warships, the Soviet Union would still have a formidable
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position in the Mediterranean. Naval ships not needed in a
"closed-in" Black Sea Fleet could be transferred to the
Pacific Fleet which currently supports an Indian Ocean deploy'
ment. From there, they could deploy to the Indian Ocean and
the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet Union would still have an
advantage over the United States in meeting requirements of
a Mediterranean deployment because, with Gibraltar closed,
Soviet ships from the Pacific Fleet would still be nearer to
the Mediterranean Sea than ships of the United States' naval
fleets and because the Soviet Navy maintains a powerful
force in the northwestern section of the Indian Ocean which
would be available to reinforce the Mediterranean Squadron
or to react on short notice to some tactical requirement in
the Mediterranean Sea. The canal is neither deep enough nor
wide enough to accommodate United States aircraft carriers.
(20:9) Balistic-missile submarines could not transit the
canal undetected. Passage of the Suez Canal, alone, would
not permit the United States Navy to perform its mission in
the Mediterranean Sea.
If the Mediterranean were declared a "closed sea," the
effect would be the same as if the Turkish Straits, the
Suez Canal, and the Strait of Gibraltar were closed to the
passage of warships. For reasons previously discussed,
this arrangement should be satisfactory and probably bene-
ficial to the Soviet Union and might receive Soviet support.
If the Mediterranean Sea were closed to warships of non-
Mediterranean nations and the Soviet Union were forced to
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rely on its merchant navy to maintain the influence provided
there by its warships, Soviet influence might be expected to
decrease, as would the influence wielded by the United States
As the power of non-Mediterranean nations waned, the influ-
ence generated by the military forces of Mediterranean
nations could be expected to increase. While the situation
would not be completely satisfactory to the Soviet Govern-
ment, the Soviets would still have advantages over the posi-
tion that could be maintained by the United States. The
Soviet merchant fleet is under closer control of the Soviet
Government than is the merchant fleet of the United States
by its government and the Soviet merchants could be expected
to be better representatives of government policy than the
fleet of the United States. In addition, the proximity to
the Mediterranean of both the Soviet Navy and the territory
of the Soviet Union itself with its large army is more
imposing than a United States and its navy across the
Atlantic Ocean. A loss of Soviet influence in the Mediter-
ranean would be accompanied by a greater loss of influence
by the United States. This relative gain for the Soviet
Union accompanied by the removal of a threat to the Soviet
homeland from the Mediterranean could make the closing of
the Mediterranean an attractive situation for the Soviet
Union.
In any event, the Soviet reaction to a change in the
regime of the Turkish Straits would be no matter of simple
considerations but would be a result of interrelated events
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which could cause shifts in the balance of power in the
Mediterranean Sea and which might change the threat in the
Mediterranean to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would
accept any change to the regime of the Turkish Straits so
long as the change of regime did not increase the military
threat to the Soviet Union and so long as the change did
not affect the balance of power in the Mediterranean to the
detriment of the Soviet Government.
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V. THE INDONESIAN STRAITS
A. DESCRIPTION
The Indonesian archipelago contains or borders on five
straits which are all of some significance to ships transit-
ing between the Pacific Ocean or South China Sea and the
Indian Ocean. These navigable straits are Malacca, Lombok,
Sunda, Ombai, and Wetar. All five straits would be
overlapped by territorial waters if 12 miles were the inter-
nationally accepted breadth of territorial waters because
the straits narrow to less than 24 miles and the countries
bounding them now claim a 12 mile territorial sea.
1 . The Strait of Malacca
The Strait of Malacca joins the South China Sea with
the Indian Ocean. The Strait is bordered by the Malay
Peninsula on the northeast and the Indonesian island of
Sumatra on the southwest. Malacca is over 500 miles long
and more than 200 miles wide at its northwestern meeting
with the Andaman Sea arm of the Indian Ocean. The south-
eastern entrance narrows to a stretch of 21 miles and is
cluttered with islands. The Malacca shipping channel is of
sufficient depth for any ship to pass except for its narrow
section where ships with a draft greater than 63 feet would
find the Strait very dangerous to transit and ships such as





Sunda Strait connects the Java Sea on the north with
the Indian Ocean to the south. It is bounded by Sumatra on
the west and Java on the east and several small islands lie
between. The two major passages between the islands are 16
and 22 miles in width with minimum depths of 84 and 126 feet
near the center areas of the two channels. Sunda Strait
connects waters claimed to be "internal Indonesian waters"
with the open seas of the Indian Ocean.
3. Lombok Strait
Lombok Strait connects the Java Sea on the north with
the Indian Ocean to the south. The Strait is bounded by Bali
on the west and Lombok Island on the east. One large island
and two small islands lie in the center of the Strait creat-
ing two shipping channels which are the narrowest sections
of the Strait. The western Channel is six miles wide with
a minimum depth of 800 feet near the center. The eastern
channel is eleven miles wide and has a minimum depth greater
than 700 feet near the center of the channel. Lombok
Strait connects waters which Indonesia claims as its
"internal waters" with open seas in the Indian Ocean.
4
.
Ombai and Wetar Straits
Ombai and Wetar Straits are a continuous stretch of
water connecting the Banda Sea and the Savu Sea between the
Portuguese island of Timor and the Indonesian islands of
Wetar for the Wetar Strait and Alor for the Ombai Strait.





minimum depth of nearly 8000 feet. Ombai Strait has a mini-
mum width of 17 miles and a minimum depth of over 8300 feet.
The narrowest section of the entire waterway, though, lies
in the section of the passage which is the dividing point
between the two straits. At that point, the Indonesian
island of Kambung lies just 13 miles north of Portuguese
Timor and the minimum depth in that area is nearly 5500
feet. Although the eastern end of Timor is a Portuguese
possession, the western end is Indonesian and the seas at
both ends of the Ombai and Wetar Straits are claimed by
Indonesia as internal waters.
B. REGIME OF THE INDONESIAN STRAITS
The regime of the Indonesian straits is shrouded in
difference of opinion. Because of the uncertainties con-
cerning the Indonesian straits and depending on the advan-
tages a nation intends to derive from use of the straits,
different nations claim different legal regimes apply to the
Indonesian straits.
Nations which look for advantages in right of passage
will desire application of traditional law which provides a
territorial sea of three miles. A three mile territorial
sea would leave a channel of "high seas" waters wherein all
ships could enjoy unrestricted navigation through all the
Indonesian straits.
The coastal nation desiring control over maritime acti-
vity in adjacent waters might make some unilateral legal
88

claim and attempt to displace traditional law. The aspira-
tion of a nation making such a claim would be that lack of
opposition or only minor resistance to the legal claim might,
over time, legitimate the claim to the extent that it would
enter the realm of traditional law. Even if this aspiration
were not met, a unilateral claim would give a nation a
bargaining position from which it might obtain a better
position, through compromise, than it might expect under
traditional or conventional law.
Two legal events have occurred which demonstrate that
the coastal states desire to increase their control over
ships transiting the Indonesian straits and that they
desire to replace the traditional law of the sea. The first
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second is a twelve-mile territorial sea claim by Indonesia
and Malaysia and an accompanying claim to control over the
right of ships to transit Malacca. (26:23)
According to the Archipelago Doctrine, the waters within
a baseline surrounding the Indonesian islands are claimed
to be Indonesian internal waters. The word "archipelago"
was originally the name given to the Aegean Sea but it was
later used as the term to describe the group of islands in
the Aegean. The word has now come to mean any cluster of
islands which may be considered as a whole. On 13 December
1957, the Indonesian government declared that the group of
Indonesian islands would be considered an entity or
"archipelago." (Appendix I) The Archipelago Doctrine is
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supported by precedents in the archipelago claims of Denmark,
Norway, and the Philippine Islands. The Soviet Union
supported the Indonesian claim as being in accordance with
the rules of international law. (28:39)
The position was again presented at the Caracas Law of
the Sea Conference in 1974 by Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius,
and the Philippine Islands. The four island nations pre-
sented the following proposal:
1. An archipelagic State, whose component islands
and other natural features form an intrinsic geo-
graphical, economic and political entity and histori-
cally have or may have been regarded as such, may
draw straight baselines connecting the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago from
which the extent of the territorial sea of the archi-
pelagic State is, or may be determined.
2. The waters within the baselines, regardless of
their depth or distance from the coast, the seabed
and the subsoil thereof and the superjacent airspace
as well as all their resources belong to and are
subject to the sovereignty of the archipelagic
State. (33:317)
The proposal was endorsed by the Organization of African
States, Uruguay, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru.
The archipelago concept could affect Sunda, Lombok,
Ombai, and Wetar Straits. The effect of the "Archipelago
Doctrine" would be that these straits would be considered
within Indonesian internal waters which would mean that
passage of the straits would be solely at the discretion of
the Indonesian government. Although the original Indonesian
declaration stated ". . . freedom of navigation solely at
the discretion of Indonesia," the Indonesian representative
to the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva, 1958, stated
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his country chose to permit freedom of navigation provided
that it did not endanger Indonesia's security or damage its
interests." (26:27) The concept was implemented by a
Government Regulation of 18 February 1960 and the declara-
tion allowed innocent passage to foreign vessels passing
through Indonesian internal waters but it also stated that
the innocent passage would be regulated by Government
Ordinance. (28:39) The Indonesian government requires prior
notification and authorization for transit of warships
through its internal waters unless normal shipping routes
are used. Informal notification is acceptable to the
Indonesian government and no specific advance time period
is required. (28:42)
The second attempt to regulate the regime of the Indo-
nesian straits was a joint action by Indonesia and Malaysia
in November 1971. Until that time, the Strait of Malacca
had been considered an international waterway. Then, with
each nation claiming a twelve-mile limit to territorial
waters and their territorial waters overlapping in the
narrow section of the Strait, Indonesia and Malaysia pro-
claimed joint ownership of the Strait of Malacca. The over-
lapping boundaries gave the two nations a legal basis for
claiming Malacca as their joint property. In March, 1972,-
Indonesia and Malaysia issued a statement which confirmed
their previous claim to the Strait of Malacca. They declared
that the Strait would remain open for "innocent passage" of
normal sea traffic. (15:23)
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A nation, such as Indonesia, interested in controlling
passage prefers to claim a broader territorial sea, thereby
putting straits within territorial waters, and then apply
conventional law, embodied in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which applies
innocent passage to ships transiting territorial waters.
Passage is considered innocent so long as it is not pre-
judicial to the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal State. Innocent passage means navigation through
the territorial sea without entering internal waters, or of
proceeding to internal waters, or of making for the high
seas from internal waters. Ships may stop and anchor if
the actions are incidental to ordinary navigation or neces-
sitated by distress. Innocent passage requires submarines
to travel on the surface and to show their flags. A problem
with innocent passage is that conventional law leaves
"prejudicial passage" and "security threat" to be determined
by the coastal State so that a coastal State may actually
have a greater control over its territorial waters than the
superficial provisions of innocent passage might imply
since prejudice and threat may be judged by the different
standards of different nations and the standards need not
be applied impartially.
The Indonesian and Malaysian governments claimed two
exceptions to the rule of innocent passage. First they
barred passage of all foreign tankers over 200,000 deadweight
tons as a measure against pollution. (15:23) This restriction
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was not enforced because Japan agree.d to help install addi-
tional navigational aids in the Malacca Strait in return for
the right for Japanese supertankers of greater bulk to use
the Strait. Nevertheless, ships larger than 300,000 dead-
weight tons normally use alternate routes. The fear of
pollution proved prophetic, though, when the Japanese 237,698
ton supertanker SHOWA MARU ran aground in Indonesian waters
in the narrow part of the Strait on 6 January 1975 and leaked
a ten-mile- long oil slick into the Strait of Malacca.
The second claimed exception to innocent passage of
Malacca was that foreign warships could use the Strait only
after prior consultation and with authorization of the
governments owning the territory along the intended route.
The Soviet government protested vigorously. (15:23) Authori-
zation prior to warships transiting through territorial
waters in international straits is in conflict with the
customary law of the sea, is not required by the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and is
contrary to the 1949 report of the International Court of
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case which stated, ". . .
States in time of peace have a right to send their warships
through straits used for international navigation between
two parts of the high seas without the previous authoriza-
tion of a coastal State, provided that the passage is
innocent." (30:30-31) Nevertheless, Indonesia's claim
gained credibility in December, 1971, when USS ENTERPRISE
and her task group transited the Strait of Malacca enroute
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to the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistani War. Adam
Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, "told reporters that
all foreign warships wanting to pass through the Straits
must give advance notice to Malaysia and Indonesia and
stated that the Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet had
given advance notice. He also said that he was sure Russian
ships would conform with the Indonesian requirement." (30:29)
The Archipelago Doctrine claim and the claimed regime
for the Strait of Malacca are not based on traditional
international law and these claims are disputed by many
nations. Nevertheless, neither the Indonesian government
nor the Malaysian government have relented to these counter
claims. The Soviet attitude toward these claims is con-
sidered in Sec Lions F and G.
C. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS
The Soviet Navy uses Indonesian straits for transit from
Pacific Fleet bases to the Indian Ocean. After the Mediter-
ranean Sea, the largest out-of-area Soviet naval commitment
is in the Indian Ocean. For this purpose, the Strait of
Malacca is most convenient and it is the route used by
Soviet naval shipping. The Strait is deep enough for passage
of the largest Pacific Fleet naval ship and it provides the
shortest route from Pacific Fleet ports to the Indian Ocean
area. The two disadvantages to Soviet naval ships using
Malacca are the claim that transit authorization must be
granted and that only innocent passage is permitted which
means that Soviet submarines must transit the Strait on the
surface. 04

Sunda and Lombok Straits would be satisfactory routes
because they are comparatively very deep and easy to navi-
gate. Transit of these straits causes added disadvantages,
though. The routes through Sunda or Lombok are about 1,200
miles longer than the route through Malacca. Additionally,
the Sunda and Lombok routes require travel through waters
over which Indonesia claims jurisdiction as internal waters.
The transits would be at the pleasure of the Indonesian
government and the ships would be required to comply with
Indonesian law. Since the abortive Indonesian Communist
coup of September 1965, Soviet/Indonesian relations have
been cool and the Indonesian government has shifted to a
pro-West inclination. The Soviet government is undoubtedly
hesitant to tempt Indonesian jurisdiction when it is not
necessary or when it is risky. The sea lanes through the
Indonesian archipelago are suitable for submerged transit
of submarines where Malacca is marginal. Nevertheless,
the poor relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union
could lead to an embarrassing situation if a Soviet submarine
were detected and prosecuted by Indonesian naval vessels
while attempting a surreptitious passage through the archi-
pelago. Soviet naval ships would not normally use the
routes through Indonesian internal waters to Sunda and Lombok
Straits
.
Ombai and Wetar Straits are completely impractical for
navigation by Soviet naval ships or even Soviet merchant
ships. The route has the same disadvantages as Sunda and
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Lombok Straits and, in addition, the passage is a route
leading from Indonesian internal waters to Indonesian inter-
nal waters and it is an inconvenient, out-of-the-way route
of no practical significance. The route would not be used
by Soviet naval shipping.
A glance at the Indonesian straits quickly reveals that
Malacca is of great importance because of the Soviet naval
commitment in the Indian Ocean. The closure of the Suez
Canal increased the importance of Malacca because the
closure meant the most efficient way for the Soviet Navy to
send ships into the Indian Ocean was to use its Pacific
Fleet which made Malacca the primary route.
The other straits pale in comparison. No other route
is as convenient and all other Indonesian straits are under
greater control of the Indonesian government than is the
Strait of Malacca. That means that Malacca is both the
best route and that it is the route by which Soviet naval
shipping is most likely to have access between the Indian
Ocean and the South China Sea. While the Sunda and Lombok
Straits might rate some consideration as alternate routes
if the Soviet Navy were to station large ships in the Pacific
Fleet, Ombai and Wetar Straits could be of no practical use
to the Soviet Navy. The remainder of this chapter will
consider only the Strait of Malacca as the Indonesian strait
used by the Soviet Navy.
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D. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS RELATED TO SOVIET NAVAL MISSIONS
1. Strategic Mission
The Strait of Malacca would be of importance if the
Soviet Navy were required to send ballistic-missile-firing
submarines from the Pacific Fleet into the Indian Ocean.
The necessity for such a transit is not likely, though, be-
cause there are no countries near the littoral of the Indian
Ocean which pose a threat to the Soviet Union and which can-
not be deterred by Soviet strategic submarines on station in
either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. With the introduction
of the Delta Class Soviet submarine carrying the SS-N-8
missile, ' long-distance deterrence became a Soviet naval
capability. (25:153) The only practical reasons that a
Soviet strategic submarine might want to enter the Indian
Ocean would be the possibility of increasing accuracy by
decreasing the range to an Indian Ocean target or to
complicate the antisubmarine warfare problem of an enemy by
widening the locations- from which a missile might be fired
at that enemy. Neither option has merit when the cost is
revealing the location of a Soviet strategic submarine when
passing through the Strait of Malacca or through some
alternate narrow waterway. Accuracy is not the only consid-
eration when deterrence is practiced and the antisubmarine
warfare problem is sufficiently complex when the entire






Defense of the Soviet homeland is a mission of
Soviet naval ships transiting the Strait of Malacca in that
the Soviet Navy might be able to strike at an Indian Ocean
nation which might launch an attack against Soviet territory
or in that it might locate and destroy United States sub-
marines patroling the Indian Ocean on a strategic mission
against the Soviet Union. The power of the Soviet Navy
could intimidate an Indian Ocean nation which might have
attack against the Soviet Union as one of its possible
national objectives. While this remains a possibility, the
probability of an Indian Ocean nation launching an attack
against the Soviet Union is sufficiently small so as to
remove it from any immediate practical consideration. The
use of Soviet naval surface ships and attack submarines
against United States submarines is a realistic mission,
though, because the Indian Ocean provides a close patrol
area from which the Soviet Union is vulnerable to. a missile
attack launched at its industrial areas. The attack sub-
marine in a trailing position would be especially useful in
defending Soviet territory against a missile attack by
United States submarines patroling the Indian Ocean.
3 Naval Presence
The most important use the Soviet Navy makes of the
Strait of Malacca is to send ships from the Pacific Fleet
into the Indian Ocean for the purpose of maintaining a naval
presence and, therby, exerting influence for achieving
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foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government. A
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean began in 1968 when
Soviet naval ships spent 1,800 ship-days there and that
presence grew steadily increasing to 8,800 ship operating-
days by 1972. (these figures include noncombatants such as
hydrographic research vessels ) (2:13)
At one time, the Indian Ocean was a British lake
but, as England's power waned, the British withdrew from
the Indian Ocean area leaving a power vacuum. Before the
withdrawal, the Soviet Union had been a strong land power
north of the Indian Ocean littoral but its influence had
been offset by British seapower. After the British with-
drawal, the Soviet Union was presented with the opportunity
to assert its power by filling the British vacuum and of
becoming the undisputed "visible" power to most of Asia and
Africa. The Soviet Navy is now the most formidable power
seen from the Indian Ocean littoral nations. It is a force
that is capable of many activities which might be advantageous
in promoting the Soviet interests. The force might be used
for direct intervention in local conflicts, it can interdict
supply routes from the Middle East to Europe, Japan, and the
United States, it can monitor and control access to the Suez
Canal after it is reopened, and it is a visible reminder that
the Soviet Union can protect its own interests and those of
its Indian Ocean friends. These capabilities enhance the
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prestige of the Soviet Union and place the Soviets in a
stronger position to compete for political influence among
Indian Ocean nations.
Because of the closure of the Suez Canal, consider-
able transit time is required for ships to transit from the
Soviet Naval Fleet areas at the White/Barents Sea, Baltic
Sea, or Black Sea. The fleet which can most easily support
a deployment to the Indian Ocean is the Pacific Fleet.
Ships, usually from Vladivostok, transit through the Strait
of Malacca as the most convenient route for the deployment.
4. Protection of Economic Interests
The Soviet Union does have economic interest in the
Indian Ocean area since most of the Indian Ocean nations,
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the Soviet Union. (43:777) The Soviet Navy should, then, be
interested in maintaining the security of the sea routes used
in transferring commerce between the Soviet Union and the
Indian Ocean trading nations. Nevertheless, this apparent
economic interest might not be so great as it appears and
what appears to be an economic interest might actually be a
political interest.
The Indian Ocean trading partners of the Soviet
Union must be considered "underdeveloped nations." They are
generally rich in natural resources but do not have the capa-
bility to produce sophisticated manufactured products. The
Soviet Union is also rich in natural resources and, although
the Soviets must import some raw materials, its important
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imports are technology, the products. of technology, and food
which are scarce along the Indian Ocean littoral. (43:778-779)
The transactions between the Soviet Union and the Indian
Ocean nations must be other than an economic necessity where
Soviet interest is concerned. The remaining purpose for
those transactions is political in that they are for the same
purpose as naval presence in achieving the foreign policy
goals of the Soviet government.
Even if raw materials from Indian Ocean nations were
important to the economy of the Soviet Union, the Strait of
Malacca would be of minimal importance to trade between the
Indian Ocean nations and the Soviet Union. Malacca connects
the Indian Ocean with a non- industrial area of the Soviet
Union. Raw materials delivered to the East Russian Siberia
area would still have to be transported thousands of miles
by rail to arrive in the Soviet industrial areas. Commerce
between the Soviet Union and Indian Ocean nations would
travel either over land or around Africa for delivery to the
Soviet industrial areas on the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.
The resulting situation is that trade between the
Soviet Union and Indian Ocean nations is probably not of
economic significance to the Soviet Union but would fit more
appropriately under the mission of "presence" and, even if
the commerce were economically significant to the Soviet
Union, the Strait of Malacca would not be an important water
route to Soviet industrial areas. Protection of economic
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interest is not a major objective of Soviet naval ships
transiting the Strait of Malacca.
E. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
As an alternative to transiting Malacca for accomplishing
its Indian Ocean mission, the Soviet Navy may either send
ships from another of its naval fleet areas or it. may travel
another sea route between the Pacific Fleet area and the
Indian Ocean.
If naval ships were sent into the Indian Ocean from the
North, Baltic, or Black Sea Fleets, the trip would be longer
than alternate routes from the Pacific Fleet and it would
mean an added burden to the operating schedules of ships from
the fleet chosen to support the commitment. After the Suez
Canal is reopened, the situation will change since ships
from the Black Sea Fleet will be closer to the Indian Ocean
than ships from the Pacific Fleet. Then ships from the
Black Sea Fleet will probably begin to augment the Indian
Ocean Force.
A problem in relying on ships from other fleets to fill
the Indian Ocean commitment is that the best routes from all
other fleet areas require transits through international
straits which arc now overlapped by territorial waters or
would be overlapped by territorial waters if the standard
limit to territorial waters were established at 12 miles.
The only route free of those straits would be from the
North Fleet area, south through the Atlantic Ocean, and
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around the southern tip of Africa into the Indian Ocean.
That is the longest of all routes. The problem caused by
these straits is that the circumstances concerning Malacca
are similar to the other straits through which passage
would be required and, if the Soviet Navy were legally pro-
hibited from using Malacca for transit of warships, the same
restriction might be applied to the other international
straits so that they might not be reliable for passage if
Malacca is closed.
If Malacca is closed, the other alternatives would be
sea lanes in the vicinity of Malacca. Because of Indone-
sia's "Archipelago Doctrine," Indonesia would have a better
legal position in closing its interna] straits than in
closing Malacca so Sunda, Lombok, Ombai, and Wetar would
rate no consideration as alternate routes to Malacca. This
leaves just two sea routes. One route is to the north of
Australia and the other is to the south of Australia.
North of Australia, ships would travel the Torres Strait
between Cape York, Australia, and New Guinea which avoids
the Indonesian archipelago. The route is well marked but
it is a tortuous passage with a limiting depth of 37 feet
established by the Torres Strait Pilots Association. (26:31)
The route is sufficiently deep for the passage of any ship
in the Soviet Pacific Fleet but the route is difficult and
lengthy so that it is not a desireable route. Because the
103

channel is narrow and long, it could be easily closed by
either natural or man made phenomena.
If Soviet naval ships were to travel south of Australia,
the route would pass through the Soloman Islands, the Coral
Sea, and the Tasman Sea before turning westward to proceed
into the Indian Ocean. This adds about 7,000 miles to the
distance which would be traveled by transiting Malacca.
The route is avoided by shipping because of the added dis-
tance and because it contains many uncharted reefs and
shoals. (16:14)
One more possibility for an alternate route to bypass
Malacca would be created if a canal were constructed across
the Kra Isthmus in the Malaysia peninsula. The idea has
been a consideration for many years but there is no reason
to believe that construction of a canal might occur in the
near future. A canal on the Kra Isthmus could offer an
unobstructed deep water route 900 miles shorter than the trip
through Malacca. A Kra Canal would then be the best route
for transiting between Soviet Pacific Fleet ports and the
Indian Ocean but it would be regulated by the jurisdiction
of Thailand and possibly other countries which might acquire
treaty rights in return for construction assistance. The
advantage to the Soviet Union would occur only if the Soviet'
Union were on good terms with the nation exercising juris-
diction over the Kra Canal.
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F. POSSIBLE REGIMES FOR THE STRAIT OF MALACCA
The claimed regime of the Strait of Malacca would be more
restrictive than the traditional regime with traditional
three-mile territorial seas and, under traditional law, all
ships would be permitted free passage through the center,
high seas channel of the Strait. If a twelve-mile territor-
ial sea were established and under conventional law, ships
would be granted at least innocent passage through Malacca.
Indonesia and Malaysia, however, additionally require prior
consultation and authorization before passage of warships
is allowed. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone states, "There shall be no suspension of
the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which
are used for international navitaticn between one part of
the high seas and another part of the high seas ..." The
Soviet Union favors free passage of international straits
but should at least comply with the conventional agreement
allowing only innocent passage through territorial waters
where the requirement is legitimate.
The Soviets also object to prior consultation and auth-
orization before warships may transit the straits. (15:23)
This is inconsistent with the policy established in the
Soviet Manual of International Marit ime Law which states,
"With regard to innocent passage of warships through foreign
territorial seas, some States adhere to the authorization
before foreign warships may call in the territorial sea of
another State ..." "The absence of uniformity in the
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practice of states constitutes irrefutable proof that the
so-called 'right of innocent passage* of warships cannot be
regarded as a universally-recognized rule of international
law." "Foreign warships and merchant vessels must observe
the rules and laws of coastal States with respect to navi-
gation and transport." (1:23)
The Soviet position is hypocritical in that while, on
one hand, the Soviet Union claims a twelve-mile territorial
sea and, in her literature, supports Indonesia's position
requiring notification, on the other hand, the Soviet Union
has objected to the result of Indonesia's twelve-mile
claim which has threatened the Soviet Navy's freedom of
passage in the Malacca Strait.
Indonesia and Malaysia still insist on the authorization
procedure. Although the situations are not exactly the
same, precedents might be found in some of the procedures
for passage of the Danish and Turkish Straits. If the
Soviet Union or some other power does not pressure Indonesia
and Malaysia into relenting the authorization requirement,
the requirement could become legally unassailable as
customary law.
While the claimed requirements for passage of warships
through the Strait of Malacca are already in excess either
of traditional law of the sea or of the regime provided by
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, a possibility still remains that further restrictions
might be imposed. The granting of innocent passage for
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merchant ships will probably not change because merchant
shipping is too important to Malaysia and Indonesia to risk
tampering with the agreement permitting navigation and
other countries would undoubtedly reply in a manner con-
trary to the interest of the Strait States. Nevertheless,
further restriction might be attempted against the transit
of warships
.
Reasons for an attempt to further restrict passage of
warships through the Strait of Malacca could be either
worsened relations between the Strait States and the Soviet
Union or United States, the urging of Indian Ocean nations
to prevent warships of outside powers from entering the
Indian Ocean for fear that those nations will control the
politics of littoral nations, or as a means of obtaining
financing for dredging and maintaining the navigability of
the channel. These three changes are all real possibilities
Indonesia would probably react to even the hint of a
Communist threat because memories of the 196S coup attempt
are still fresh. One way Indonesia could obtain a position
for bargaining with the Soviet Union is by threatening or
announcing further restrictions to the passage of warships
through the Strait of Malacca. This position might be
supported by some of the Indian Ocean nations whose power is
reduced by the presence of warships of powerful nations. A
charge for passage of warships and merchant ships could be
decided upon because neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are
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financially capable of improving the Malacca channel or
properly improving and maintaining its aids to navigation.
G. SOVIET REACTION
If a charge were levied upon ships transiting the Strait
of Malacca, the Soviet government would probably object to
the practice for both merchant and naval ships. The Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone permits
charges to be levied on foreign merchant ships passing
through the territorial sea for specific services rendered
to the ship. Bending this regulation to require payment
from all ships transiting Malacca in order to upgrade the
channel or install and maintain navigation aids might
receive some consideration as a legitimate cause since an
accident which would block the shipping channel would be
disadvantageous to all nations using the Strait. All nations
using the Strait would benefit from the improvement of the
channel but a toll would be a completely unacceptable method
of financing improvements because no nation would choose
to legitimate any such practice which might later become
traditional law and which might prove to be a dangerous
precedent for the consideration of other Strait States. To
avoid these distasteful results but to ensure maintenance
and navigability of the Malacca channel, nations whose ships
ply the Malacca route would probably reply to a toll proposal
with a formal or informal offer of financial aid which would
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set no precedent and which would enable the Strait States
to maintain the channel properly.
Closure of Malacca to the passage of warships would not
receive so considerate a reaction. The alternate routes in
lieu of the Strait of Malacca present a real hardship to the
Soviet Navy in achieving its goal in the Indian Ocean. The
added transit time means that, in order to maintain the
same size force in the Indian Ocean, a larger number of ships
would be required in the Pacific Fleet or time between de-
ployments would be shortened. Increasing the number of
ships is an added expense to construction, facilities,
maintenance, and manpower. Shortening time between deploy-
ments takes time away from training and maintenance so that
readiness would be degraded. Addj ti nnal 1 y , acceptance of
closure of the Strait of Malacca to the passage of warships
would be a dangerous precedent and the Soviet Navy would
have to expect threats of closure of the Turkish and Danish
Straits if they were to accept closure of Malacca. With the
undoubted support of all maritime nations, the Soviet Union
would continue to send its warships through the Strait of





From analysis of individual sets of straits, specific
judgments are possible in the areas of Soviet naval transits,
transits related to Soviet naval missions, possible alter-
nate routes, possible changes to legal regimes, and probable
Soviet reactions. These findings should lead to a conclu-
sion concerning the significance of international straits to
Soviet naval operations and concerning the influence of the
Soviet Navy in determining the Soviet position on the proper
legal status of international straits.
A. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS
The Soviet Navy .transits international straits enroute
to many of its operating areas and, in other cases, to reach
open ocean areas. Right of passage through international
straits, then, is important to the Soviet Navy.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet uses Sea of Japan straits for
its ships to transit from its Sea of Japan bases, mainly
from Vladivostok, to open ocean areas in the Pacific and to
the Indian Ocean. For transiting to the Indian Ocean,
Soviet naval ships also use Indonesian Straits. The Soviet
Black Sea Fleet must pass through the Turkish Straits in
order to leave the Black Sea and, once clear of the Black
Sea, would still be required to transit either the Suez
Canal or the Strait of Gibraltar if its ships were to depart
the Mediterranean enroute to the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic
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Ocean. Ships stationed in the Baltic Sea Fleet must transit
either the Danish Straits or the Kiel Canal if they are to
transit out of the Baltic into the Pacific Ocean.
The Soviet Union has one fleet area which is not
restricted by narrow straits. The North Fleet area, in the
vicinity of Murmansk, offers relatively unimpeded access to
the Atlantic Ocean. The Murmansk environment is uncomfortably
frigid but an offshoot of the gulf stream keeps the sea lanes
open with only occasional help from ice breakers.
Returning to the Pacific Fleet, the naval base on the
Kamchatka Peninsula, at Petropavlovsk, is unimpeded by
narrow straits but it is hampered by icing conditions. The
bases at Petropavlovsk and Murmansk, then, are the only
major bases from which Soviet naval ships may deploy without
fear that their transits may be impeded by a requirement to
pass through a narrow strait.
B. SOVIET NAVAL TRANSITS RELATED TO SOVIET NAVAL MISSIONS
1 . Strategic Mission
Soviet ballistic-missile-firing submarines are not
required to pass through narrow straits to reach a station
in either the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean. Soviet offensive
strategic submarines are based at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk
from where they have unimpeded access to open oceans. If
these submarines were required to travel into the Mediter-
ranean Sea or the Indian Ocean, straits would lie on their
best transit routes. These transits are not necessary,
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however, because the newest submarine-launched ballistic
missile has a range in excess of 4,000 miles which allows
a submarine to deter any potential aggressor without having
to pass through a narrow waterway in order to be within
firing range.
2 . Defense of the Homeland
A passive defense of the Soviet homeland would not
require the Soviet Navy to transit narrow straits nor would
it require its ships to leave port. Now that an enemy has
the capability of striking at the Soviet homeland from
extended ranges, however, a passive defense is not adequate
and the Soviet Navy must range far from Soviet shores in
order to properly defend against attack from the sea. This
would include both surface ships and attack submarines to
combat carrier strike forces and offensive strategic submarines
For proper defense in the Pacific, the Sea of Japan
straits must remain open for passage of Soviet naval ships
because attack against the Soviet Union could be launched
from outside the Sea of Japan and it would have to be
countered by ships transiting through the Sea of Japan straits.
Pacific Fleet ships also need to pass through narrow straits
to transit to the Indian Ocean to establish a force which
could counter a possible surface or subsurface threat which
could easily reach vital areas of the Soviet Union if an




To defend against United States surface and submarine
threats in the Mediterranean Sea, Soviet naval surface ships
must transit out of the Black Sea through the Turkish
Straits. Defensive Soviet submarines from the North Fleet
travel into the Mediterranean Sea via the Strait of Gibraltar
The exits from the North Fleet and the Baltic Fleet areas
are so close that Baltic Fleet ships should not be required
to transit out of the Baltic Sea to perform a defensive
mission which could be performed as easily and in as timely
a manner by a larger, newer, better prepared North Fleet.
Only a major, all-out defensive effort in the Atlantic Ocean
would cause Baltic Fleet ships to deploy outside their home
waters and, in that case, right of passage through narrow
waterways would be a requirement.
3. Naval Presence
In order for the Soviet Navy to accomplish an objec-
tive of deploying as a representative of Soviet governmental
policy, its surface ships need to transit narrow waterways.
This is especially true in the cases of ships deploying into
the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and, to some
extent, to the Pacific Ocean, the West African Coast, and
the Caribbean sea.
Ships deploying to the Mediterranean Sea are
normally members of the Black Sea Fleet and must transit
the Turkish Straits to reach their operating areas. If the
Black Sea Fleet ships are to be used in the Atlantic Ocean,
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they will run the gauntlet of the Turkish Straits, the
Mediterranean Sea enclosure, and the Strait of Gibraltar.
The Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean is
supported by the Pacific Fleet and its optimal routes pro-
ceed through Indonesian straits. After the Suez Canal is
reopened, the Black Sea Fleet ships will be nearer the
Indian Ocean than Pacific Fleet ships. If Black Sea Fleet
ships begin deploying to the Indian Ocean, they will be
required to transit both the Turkish Straits and the Suez
Canal to reach their stations.
To a lesser extent, a Soviet naval presence is
maintained in Pacific Ocean areas by ships transiting the
Sea of Japan straits. Another minimal presence could be
provided in the Caribbean and the West African coast by
Black Sea Fleet ships transiting the Turkish Straits and the
Strait of Gibraltar or by Baltic Fleet ships transiting the
Danish Straits. A naval presence is normally maintained,
though, by North Fleet ships which do not experience such
restricted passages enroute to their destinations.
4 . Protection of Economic Interests
Soviet naval ships might require access to inter-
national straits in order to keep them open for passage of
Soviet merchant vessels or they might need to pass through
one strait in order to transit to another strait where
Soviet merchant ships have an economic interest in passage
of that second strait. It is improbable that any nation
would close an international strait to the passage of
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merchant ships, though, unless the coastal nation were at
war with the nation whose merchant ships required passage,
the coastal nation feared pollution from the merchant ship,
or some specific situation short of war prompted a limited
quarantine such as the United States Navy performed in an
open-ocean area against ships carrying missiles into Cuba
in 1962. In any of these cases, a strong Soviet Navy
might be able to open narrow waterways for the passage of
Soviet merchant ships or ships carrying Soviet exports or
imports
.
The Sea of Japan straits might need to be opened if
Japan were to attempt to prevent the Soviets from carrying
on seaborne commerce with the Soviet Far East. The sea
lines of communication are important because the only
alternate supply route is the Trans-Siberian railroad
which runs close to the Chinese border and could easily
become an unreliable route. The Indonesian straits could
also become important as a line of commercial communications
between the Indian Ocean and the eastern Soviet Union.
The main Soviet industrial area must also be pro-
tected by maintaining commerce into the Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea. This means ensuring passage of the Danish
Straits, the Turkish Straits, and the Strait of Gibraltar.
Suspension of merchant passage through any of these straits
could be crippling to any Soviet industrial effort relying




Alternate routes exist in most cases where the Soviet
Navy might be threatened with suspension of the passage of
its ships through international straits. In the cases
where no alternate routes exist, the mission of the ships
normally transiting the closed strait could be performed by
Soviet naval ships from another fleet area. While alternate
routes or alternate means exist, development of new alter-
natives would be less satisfactory than presently used
routes and methods.
In some cases, alternatives are already in use and
have become normal operating procedures. An example is the
case of offensive strategic submarines which the Soviet Navy
stations in Petropavlovsk so that they will be located in
areas from which they can deploy without a requirement to
transit narrow straits where they would be expected to pro-
ceed on the surface which would ensure detection. To
achieve the objective of access to open ocean without passage
through straits, Soviet submarines are faced with the fiercer
winter weather and more difficult lines of logistic support
that exist on the Kamchatka Peninsula. They would not have
to face these difficulties if they were satisfied with basing
at Vladivostok which would require them to transit straits
while exiting the Sea of Japan.
Another case is that the Soviet Navy is required to
send logistic support to its Indian Ocean force from Pacific
Fleet bases instead of the nearer Black Sea bases because of
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the closure of the Suez Canal. The Suez closure also means
that there is no possibility of conveniently sending ships
from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to reinforce the Indian Ocean
force so that the best remaining procedure is to staff the
Indian Ocean force with Pacific Fleet ships.
A third case where alternatives have been selected is
the buildup of the North Fleet which is the largest Soviet
fleet with the newest ships. This buildup was probably the
result of a longer ice- free season in Murmansk and because
ships stationed in the North Fleet do not pass through
narrow straits enroute to open oceans as would be the case
if Soviet naval ships from the Black Sea or Baltic Sea
Fleets were to operate in the Atlantic Ocean. Even though
straits are a problem, the Murmansk alternative might well
have been chosen, though, since it is generally a more
hospitable port than Black Sea or Baltic Sea ports solely
on the bases of its milder climate. Ships from Murmansk
still must pass through the relatively narrow Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom Gap for access to the Atlantic Ocean.
While the Soviet Navy has tailored its forces to take
best advantage of existing naval geography, any further
changes to transit patterns would create a hardship to the
performance of Soviet naval missions by either adding to the
operational requirements of another Soviet fleet or extend-
ing transit time which decreases time available for ship
maintenance, training, and time on station.
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D. POSSIBLE LEGAL REGIMES
Change in a strait's legal regime could be created by
either one of two methods: evolution of customary law or by
changing conventional law. Either method could be equally
valid but neither would be easily implemented.
Law could be changed by the simple acceptance or non-
objection to a claim to law over a period of time. Then
the claim would become established in traditional law. No
seafaring nation with the strength to object would stand by
idly and permit a restrictive claim to law to become legiti-
mized and enter the realm of traditional law. On the other
hand, a coastal nation's capability of controlling a narrow
waterway in its territorial sea is hardly an insignificant
factor and that capability lo enforce a nation's will in its
territorial waters could be enough to establish a new regime
for an international strait. This situation does not apply
presently to the Danish Straits or the Turkish Straits
where agreements are already in force to regulate passage
and presently it does not apply to the Sea of Japan straits
where passage is not opposed by coastal states. Nevertheless,
it could become significant in the case of the Indonesian
straits where the coastal states are attempting to claim a
regime which is not favorable to and not completely accept-
able to the maritime nations whose ships use the straits.
A change to conventional law could be made by bilateral
or miltilateral agreements or compromises. A vehicle for
accomplishing this type of change is an international
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conference such as the Law of the Sea Conference which will
reconvene at Geneva, Switzerland, in March, 1975. Agreement
at this type of conference is difficult when national
interests are at a great variance. The result, if one is
possible, would likely be compromise.
In any event, a change to the regime of an international
strait would probably produce a more restrictive regime. A
less restrictive legal regime would be accompanied by a
weakening in the bargaining possibilities for a coastal
nation so that the coastal nation would undoubtedly object
to the change. The currently accepted regimes of straits
are entrenched in traditional law so that the coastal
states certainly have precedent and support for resisting a
weakening of their control over ships transiting straits
where legal regimes are established.
While a coastal state will attempt to either maintain
the current regime of an international strait or claim a
more restrictive regime, a maritime nation which uses the
strait will attempt at least to maintain the strait's cur-
rent regime by preventing legitimization of more restrictive
claims to law and will, if possible, claim or negotiate a
more advantageous regime.
The Soviet Union, however, could expect any change to the
regime of an international strait to be a change which is
more restrictive to the passage of Soviet naval ships.
Because of the possibility of reciprocal disadvantage by
interruption of international commerce, unreasonable
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restrictions to the passage of merchant ships during peacetime
will probably not be attempted. Possibilities for changes to
the regimes of international straits which the Soviet Union
might expect would be imposition of tolls for passage, require
ment for notification in advance of the passage of warships,
limitations to the numbers or types of warships allowed to
transit a strait, and prevention of the passage of warships
through straits.
E. SOVIET REACTION
The Soviet reaction to a change in the regime of an
international strait would depend on the method by which a
change was implemented, on Soviet relations with the strait
State, and on the effect of any new restriction to the
Soviet Navy's capability of performing its missions. Be-
cause of the variety of possible political and geographic
situations, the Soviet reaction could vary.
If a change were implemented by a multilateral agreement
to which the Soviet Union would be signatory, the Soviet
Union would abide by the new regime. If the Soviet Union
were not signatory to the agreement, the Soviet Navy would
probably be used to show that the Soviet Union was at
variance with a more restrictive regime in order to discredit
the agreement in an attempt to prevent its becoming inter-
nationally accepted. If a change were implemented by a claim
to law, the Soviet Union would probably oppose any more
restrictive regime for a strait and, if possible, would
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odisregard the claim in an attempt to prevent it from becom-
ing traditional law through the act of international
acceptance.
A State attempting to impose any more restrictive regime
on an international strait might stand a better chance of
receiving support from the Soviet Union if the change is
small and negotiable or if the restrictive change is in the
national interest of the Soviet Union. The State might be
able to gain concessions in other areas by making a claim t
law concerning the regime of its strait and then negotiating
a compromise settlement which could remove the claimed regime
or lessen its impact in general or to the Soviet Union's
ships specifically. A State unable to negotiate with the
Soviet Union would probably receive no support for legiti-
mizing any part of a claim to law. A claim supporting the
national interest of the Soviet Union would, of course, be
unopposed.
Probably the most important determinant of a Soviet
reaction to the changed regime of a strait would be the
effect of the changed regime on the Soviet Navy's capability
of performing its missions. Naval geography plays a large
part in that effect. In some cases, restricting the passage
of naval ships through international straits could prevent
Soviet naval ships from deploying to areas where they are
needed to defend the Soviet homeland but, in other cases,
closure of an international strait to the passage of war-
ships might prevent a possible enemy from gaining access to
121

an area from which the Soviet Union might be vulnerable to
attack. In the first case, the Soviet Union would be forced
to oppose a changed regime. In the second case, the Soviet
Union most advantageously might show no reaction to a change
in a strait's legal regime. The problem caused by this
difference is that a restrictive regime, which might be in
the best interest of the Soviet Union, could be used as
precedent for restricting the regime of another strait which
Soviet naval ships might be required to transit to promote
Soviet interests or defend the Soviet homeland. The Soviet
Union, therefore, cannot afford the luxury of a double
standard when it takes a position on straits but must pro-
tect its most vital interest even though the price may be
higher than it an optimal situation were to exist. The
Soviet Union must oppose restrictions to the passage of
naval ships through international straits.
Attempted imposition of tolls would be opposed by the
Soviet Union because, even if possibly justified, it would
set a dangerous precedent. If the requirement were clearly
unreasonable, the Soviet Union would probably disregard it.
If there were some reason, such as a requirement to acquire
funds for maintenance of the strait's channel or aids to
navigation, the Soviet Union would probably consider the
cause just but negotiate some other method of achieving the
same objective, such as foreign aid or physical assistance,
in order to avoid a practice which could become accepted as
traditional law and might be regretted later.
12.2

A claim requiring notification in advance of warship
transit would meet with Soviet opposition. Announcement of
military intentions reduces the impact of a naval force. The
Soviet Union would necessarily continue to transit straits
without notice to prevent legitimization of the claim. If
the notification requirement were written into conventional
law, vhich, in practicality, would require the assent of the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would undoubtedly comply with
the letter of the law but could violate the spirit of the
law and, thereby, maintain its naval effectiveness by announc-
ing many transits whether or not they really occur or were
even planned to occur.
Limitation to the numbers of warships permitted to transit
as a group through an international strait would meet a simi-
lar reaction. A claim to law would be opposed to prevent its
legitimacy. If included in conventional law, such as the
Montreux convention, the Soviet Union would probably comply.
Unless the limitation were severe, though, its effect on
Soviet peacetime operations would normally be minimal
because Soviet forces do not need to transit in large groups
to sustain their commitments in peacetime. In wartime,
national interest would definitely determine naval policy
and legal regimes would be a secondary consideration.
If a strait State were to claim suspension of passage
for warships in international straits, the Soviet Union
would protest and disregard the claim so long as the Soviet
Union had the power to do so. In some areas, the Soviet
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Union might receive some advantage from the closure of a
strait, as discussed earlier, but this advantage would have
to be foregone to prevent the establishment of a dangerous
precedent which might later prove a disadvantage to the
Soviet Navy.
Advantage would come to the Soviet Union if, for example,
the Danish Strait or the Strait of Gibraltar were closed.
If the Danish Straits were closed to the passage of warships
and the regime of the Kiel Canal were similarly regulated,
foreign warships, such as NATO forces, would be prevented
from entering the Baltic Sea and the Soviet Union would then
need only a large enough naval force in the Baltic to ensure
Soviet domination over the relatively weak Baltic nations'
forces. Soviet naval missions would no I be degraded and
surplus Baltic Fleet ships could be transferred to supple-
ment other fleet areas.
If the Strait of Gibraltar were closed to warships,
United States naval forces would be prevented from gaining
access to the Mediterranean Sea from where they could easily
launch an attack against Soviet territory. The large Soviet
Mediterranean deployment would no longer be necessary. If
Suez were to open, United States aircraft carriers would
still not be able to enter the Mediterranean because of their
size and offensive strategic submarines would only be able
to enter the Mediterranean through a route by which their
detection would be certain. Surplus Soviet naval forces
from the Black Sea Fleet could, again, be redistributed to
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augment other fleets. In this situation, even the closure
of the Turkish Straits would not seriously degrade the
missions of the Soviet Navy. If the Soviet Navy's ships
were completely excluded from the Mediterranean Sea, Soviet
merchant ships, under Soviet governmental direction, could
adequately perform Soviet naval missions if a requirement
for deploying to the Mediterranean in defense of the Soviet
homeland were no longer necessary.
The Soviet Union, in effect, could realize the advantages
of her long-espoused closed-sea doctrine if certain straits
were closed. The effect would be the same but the method
less overtly nationalistic. The Soviet Union cannot afford
these advantages, though, because, as more nations call for
expanded territorial seas, more straits become similarly
susceptible to closure by application of the closure pre-
cedent. As the Soviet Union has expanded its seapower, it
has become more vulnerable to the effects of restrictions to
freedoms of ocean navigation. The Soviet Union must oppose
any increased restriction to freedom of its naval ships to
ply the seas in support of the Soviet government's objectives
F. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL STRAITS
The interplay between Soviet naval operations and the
legal regimes of international straits has had two effects.
It has influenced Soviet naval operations and it has played
a part in formulating the Soviet position on the law of the
sea. The Soviet Union clearly has a purpose for its navy
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in influencing other nations •• support of Soviet policy.
In order to maintain a naval force i best represent
Soviet intentions, the Soviet naval force must iave the
unlimited right :o use tho oceans, kn) restriction to a
ival shir's .Uvoss to the so -is reduces that ship's i
tiveness, A: the the Sea Co :ion, the Soviet
draft art icl es on straits used For Intel i tavigat on
are direct evidence of the inf Sc et seapower on
the decisions ... b) Soviet govei i I Leaders. - a
sign that the So-...: Navy is a major too] of Soviet or<
policy makers and that the Soviet Nav) creased
status d\\d Its own Identity i ig Soviet Litary forces,
1 . Soviet Naval Operations
Into"-. . -is: ". Its are part - tav« geog i aph)
which has determined the composition of Soviet naval 'loots
and the Locat Ion of naval ports. The North Fleet is the
largest Soviet naval fleet. There arc two possible reason!
for tins. First, the gulf stream keeps Murmansk relatively
Lce-free, Second, the North Fleet is the only fleet with
direct access to the Atlantic Ocean without passing through
narrow straits. For this second reason, the hulk of the
Soviet ballistic missile submarine force i .-• stationed in the
North Fleet, There are no ballistic missile submarines
stationed in the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea where the) would
be forced to transit through narrow straits for access to
open oceans. The Baltic Fleet has been designed so that it
can accomplish Its mission without Leaving the Balti<
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enclosure. The Black Sea Fleet does little more than provide
ships for the Mediterranean squadron and, at that, cannot
supply submarines to the Mediterranean, is limited in transit
possibilities, and must announce its transits because of the
provisions of the Montreux Convention. The North Fleet, in
a militarily superior position, has been given the capability
of handling Atlantic Ocean operations with the possibility
of being reinforced, if necessary, by ships from the Baltic
Sea and Black Sea Fleets.
In the Pacific Ocean, the main effect of internati-
onal straits on Soviet naval operations is that ballistic-
missile-firing submarines are forced to deploy from the
climatically severe Kamchatka Peninsula in order to avoid the
probability cf sure detection they would encounter if they
deployed from the Sea of Japan and through narrow straits.
If not for straits, there would be no need for the naval
base at Petropavlovsk which is remote and must present a
logistics problem.
The Indonesian straits are also a minor irritation
for Soviet surface ships entering the Indian Ocean and a
major irritation for any Soviet submarine which might desire
to enter the Indian Ocean undetected. The effect of the
Indonesian Straits must be minimal because the Soviet Union
maintains a small force in the Indian Ocean which has
experienced no apparent difficulty in transiting to its
operating areas but a large increase in Soviet Indian Ocean
activity could easily cause the Indonesian and Malaysian
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governments to carry out their threats to control passage of
warships through the Strait of Malacca which could affect the
Soviet Navy by requiring it to use much longer routes to the
Indian Ocean.
2 . The Soviet Position on the Law of the Sea
While the Soviets propose that, "In straits used for
international navigation between one part of the high seas
and another part of the high seas, all ships in transit shall
enjoy the same freedom of navigation, for purpose of transit
through such straits, as they have on the high seas.", high-
seas freedoms of transit are not really necessary to the
performance of Soviet merchantmen, Soviet fishing vessels,
Soviet research vessels, or any other Soviet ship excepting
Soviet naval ships. Innocent passage, or some similar
arrangement which allows a ship to proceed from its home port
to its destination, is sufficient for all but naval vessels.
The Soviet Navy's ships need high-seas freedoms in inter-
national straits so that Soviet submarines might transit
straits submerged, Soviet surface ships might transit straits
without giving advance notice which could delay reaction to
a crisis or announce military intentions, and Soviet aircraft
might freely fly over international straits or operate from
ships transiting the straits.
Since a coastal nation determines whether a ship's
purpose for transiting a strait is "innocent" or not, warships
are particularly vulnerable, on the whim of a coastal nation,
to being prevented from transiting a strait. Some coastal
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nation, for example, might interpret the presence of a gun on
a warship to be a danger to that nation and, on that basis,
prohibit passage of warships through straits in its territor-
ial waters. The mere presence of any other type of ship
should not be cause for a coastal nation to perceive danger
unless it was at war with the flag state. Being subject to
any restriction to the transit of international straits
presents ominous disadvantages to warships which would not
threaten the operations of other types of ships. The Soviet
position concerning international straits is tailored to




Policy of the Untied States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the
Continental Shelf (Truman Proclamation)
"By the President of the United States of America
"A PROCLAMATION
"WHEREAS the Government of the United States of America,
aware of the long range world-wide need for new sources of
petroleum and other minerals, holds the view that efforts to
discover and make available new supplies of these resources
should be encouraged; and
"WHEREAS its competent experts are of the opinion that
such resources underlie many parts of the continental shelf
off the coasts of the United States of America, and that with
modern technological progress their utilization is already
practicable or will become so at an early date; and
"WHEREAS recognized jurisdiction over these resources is
required in the interest of their conservation and prudent
utilization when and as development is undertaken; and
"WHEREAS it is the view of the Government of the United
States that the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf
by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the
Source: Churchill, Robin, S. Houston Lay, and Myron Nordquist
New Directions in the Law of the Sea - Documents
.




effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve »these resources
would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the
shore, since the continental shelf may be regarded as an exten-
sion of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally-
appurtenant to it, since these resources frequently form a sea-
ward extension of a pool or deposit lying within the territory,
and since self -protection compels the coastal nation to keep
close watch over activities off its shores which are of the
nature necessary for utilization of these resources;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim the following
policy of the United States of America with respect to the
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental
shelf.
"Having concern for the urgency of conserving and pru-
dently utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the
United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining
to the United States , subj ect to its jurisdiction and control.
In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of
another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the bound-
ary shall be determined by the United States and the State-
concerned in accordance with equitable principles. The char-
acter as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf
and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in
no way thus affected.
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"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
"Done at the City of Washington this twenty-eighth day
of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
and forty-five, and of the Independence of the United States









GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL
SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
The States Parties to this Convention
Have agreed as follows:
PART I: Territorial Sea
SECTION I. GENERAL
Article I
1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land
territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent
to its coast, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions
of these articles and to other rules of international law.
Article II
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.
SECTION II. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Article III
Except where otherwise provided in these articles, the
normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial
sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Source: Brittin, Burdick H. , and Liselotte B. Watson,
International Law for Seagoing Officers . Annapolis,




1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight base-
lines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast,
and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime
of internal waters.
3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide
elevations, unless light houses or similar installations
which are permanently above sea level have been built on them,
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable
under the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be taken, in
determining particular baselines, of economic interests pecu-
liar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance
of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied
by a State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas
the territorial sea of another State.
6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight
baselines on charts, to which due publicity must be given.
Article V
1. Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
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territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the
State.
2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in
accordance with article 4 has the effect of enclosing as
internal waters areas which previously had been considered
as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right
of innocent passage, as provided in articles 14 to 23, shall
exist in those waters.
Article VI
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every
point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of
the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea.
Article VII
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of
which belong to a single State.
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-
marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion
to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters
and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An
indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless
its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-
circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of
that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an
indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around
the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water
marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the
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presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth,
the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum
total of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths.
Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they
were part of the water area of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the
natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four
miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-
water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be con-
sidered as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of
the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles,
a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within
the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of
water that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called
"historic" bays, or in any case where the straight baseline
system provided for in. article 4 is applied.
Article VIII
For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the
outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part
of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of
the coast.
Article IX
Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unload-
ing and anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be
situated wholly or partly outside the outer limit of the
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territorial sea, are included in the territorial sea. The
coastal State must clearly demarcate such roadsteads and
indicate them on charts together with their boundaries, to
which due publicity must be given.
Article X
1. An island is a naturally-formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.
2. The territorial sea of an island is measured in
accordance with the provisions of these articles.
Article XI
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of
land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but
submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is
situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the
breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an
island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as
the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial
sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a
distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from
the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its
own.
Article XII
1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or
adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled,
failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is
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equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two
States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall
not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of
historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at
variance with this provision.
2. The line of delimitation between the territorial seas
of two States lying opposite to each ether or adjacent to
each other shall be marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal States.
Article XIII
If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline
shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river
between points on the low-tide line of its banks.
SECTION III. RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
Sub-Section A. Rules Applicable to All Ships
Article XIV
1. Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships
of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right
of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
2. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea
for the purpose either of traversing that sea without enter-
ing internal waters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or
of making for the high seas from internal waters.
3. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in
so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or .
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are rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.
4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Such passage shall take place in conformity with these arti-
cles and with other rules of international law.
5. Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be
considered innocent if they do not observe such laws and
regulations as the coastal State may make and publish in
order to prevent these vessels from fishing in the territor-
ial sea.
6. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface
and to show their flag.
Article XV
1. The coastal State must not hamper innocent passage
through the territorial sea.
2. The coastal State is required to give appropriate
publicity to any dangers to navigation, of which it has know-
ledge, within its territorial sea.
Article XVI
1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.
2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters,
the coastal State shall also have the right to take the neces
sary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which
admission of those ships to those waters is subject.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the coastal
State may, without discrimination amongst foreign ships,
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suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial
sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension
is essential for the protection of its security. Such sus-
pension shall take effect only after having been duly
published.
4. There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage
of foreign ships through straits which are used for inter-
national navigation between one part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a
foreign State.
Article XVII
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage
shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the
coastal State in conformity with these articles and other
rules of international law and, in particular , with such laws
and regulations relating to transport and navigation.
SUB- SECTION B. RULES APPLICABLE TO MERCHANT SHIPS
Article XVIII
1. No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason
only of their passage through the territorial sea.
2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing
through the territorial sea as payment only for specific
services rendered to the ship. These charges shall be levied
without discrimination.
Article XIX
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should
not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the
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territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any inves-
tigation in connexion with any crime committed on board the
ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal State; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace
of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; or
(c) If the assistance' of the local authorities has
been requested by the captain of the ship or by the consul
of the country whose flag the ship flies; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the
coastal State to take any steps authorized by its laws for
the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving
internal waters.
3,. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this article, the coastal State shall, if the captain so
requests, advise the consular authority of the flag State
before taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact
between such authority and the ship's crew. In cases of
emergency this notification may be communicated while the
measures are being taken.
4. In considering whether or how an arrest should be




5. The coastal State may not take any steps on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to
arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connexion
with any crime committed before the ship entered the terri-
torial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is
only passing through the territorial sea without entering
internal waters.
Article XX
1. The coastal State should not stop or divert a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea for the
purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a
person on board the ship.
2. The coastal State may not levy execution against or arrest
the ship for the purpose of any civil proceedings, save only
in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred
by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its
voyage through the waters of the coastal State.
3. The provisions of the previous paragraph are without
prejudice as to the right of the coastal State, in accordance
with its laws, to levy execution against or to arrest, for
the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying
in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial
sea after leaving internal waters.
SUB-SECTION C. RULES APPLICABLE TO GOVERNMENT
SHIPS OTHER THAN WARSHIPS
Article XXI
The rules contained in sub-sections A and B shall also




1. The rules contained in sub-section A and in article
19 shall apply to government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes
.
2. With such exceptions as are contained in the provi-
sions referred to in the preceding paragraph, nothing in
these articles affects the immunities which such ships enjoy
under these articles or other rules of international law.
SUB-SECTION D. RULES APPLICABLE TO WARSHIPS
Article XXIII
If any warship does not comply with the regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made
to it, the coastal State may require the warship to leave the
territorial sea.
PART II: CONTIGUOUS ZONE
Article XXIV
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its terri-
torial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or
territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea.
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2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.
3. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or
adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled,
failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its
contiguous zone beyond the median line every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from





GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS
The States Parties to this Convention,
Desiring to codify the rules of international law relating
to the high seas,
Recognizing that the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 2 7 April
1958, adopted the following provisions as generally declara-
tory of established principles of international law,
Have agreed as follows:
A ~. * - ~ 1 o 1
r\A. l-lv^-Lo x
The term "high seas" means all parts of the sea that are
not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters
of a State.
Article 2
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sover-
eignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules
of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for
coastal and non-coastal States:
Source: Churchill, Robin, S. Houston Lay, and Myron Nord-
qu i s t . New Direc tions in the Law of the Sea -
Do cuments . 2 Vols. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1975.

(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the
general principles of international law, shall be exercised
by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas .
Article 3
1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal
terms with coastal States, States having no sea-coast should
have free access to the sea. To this end States situated
between the sea and a State having no sea-coast shall by
common agreement with the latter, and in conformity with
existing international conventions, accord:
(a) To the State having no sea-coast, on a basis of
reciprocity, free transit through their territory; and
(b) To ships flying the flag of that State treatment
equal to that accorded to their own ships, or to the ships
of any other States, as regards access to seaports and the
use of such ports.
2. States situated between the sea and a State having
no sea-coast shall settle, by mutual agreement with the
latter, and taking into account the rights of the coastal
State or State of transit and the special conditions of the
State having no sea-coast, all matters relating to freedom
of transit and equal treatment in ports, in case such
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Every State, whether coastal or not, has the right to
sail ships under its flag on the high seas.
Article 5
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant
of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships
in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled
to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State
and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has
granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect.
Article 6
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only
and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in
international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject
to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may
not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of
call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or
change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more
States, using them according to convenience, may not claim
any of the nationalities in question with respect to any
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other State, and may be assimilated to. a ship without
nationality.
Article 7
The provisions of the preceding articles do not
prejudice the question of ships employed on the official
service of an inter-governmental organization flying the
flag of the organization.
Article 8
1. Warships on the high seas have complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State
2. For the purposes of these articles, the term "war-
ship" means a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State
and bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of
its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government and whose name appears in
the Navy List, and manned by a crew who are under regular
naval discipline.
Article 9
Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on
government non-commercial service shall, on the high seas,
have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State
other than the flag State.
Article 10
1. Every State shall take such measures for ships
under its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with
regard inter alia to:
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(a) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications
and the prevention of collisions;
(b) The manning of ships and labour conditions for crews
taking into account the applicable international labour
instruments
;
(c) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of
ships
.
2. In taking such measures each State is required to
conform to generally accepted international standards and to
take any steps which may be necessary to ensure their obser-
vance .
Article 11
1. In the event of a collision or of any other incident
of navigation concerning a ship on tne high seas, involving
the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or
of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or
disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such
persons except before the judicial or administrative
authorities either of the flag State or of the State of
which such person is a national.
2. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued
a master's certificate or a certificate of competence or
license shall alone be competent, after due legal process,
to pronounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if




3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a
measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authori-
ties other than those of the flag State.
Article 12
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship
sailing under its flag, in so far as he can do so without
serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers,
(a) To render assistance to any person found at sea in
danger of being lost;
(b) To proceed with all possible speed to the rescue
of persons in distress if informed of their need of assis-
tance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected
of him;
(c) After a collision, to render assistance to the
other ship, her crew and her passengers and, where possible,
to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, her
port of registry and the nearest port at which she will
call.
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment
and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and
rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and --
where circumstances so require -- by way of mutual regional




Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent
and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to
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fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for
that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship,
whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free.
Article 14
All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of priacy on the high seas or in
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Article 15
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a pri-
vate aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or air-
craft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation
of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitat-
ing an act described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-
paragraph 2 of this article.
Article 16
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed
by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose
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crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft
are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship.
Article 17
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or
aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant con-
trol to be used for the purpose of committing one of the
acts referred to in article 15. The same applies if the
ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so
long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty
of that act.
Article 18
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although
it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or
loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State
from which such nationality was derived.
Article 19
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate
ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried
out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed,
and may also determine the action to be taken with regard
to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights




Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of
piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State
making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nation-
ality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft, for any
loss or damage caused by the seizure.
Article 21
A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out
by warships or military aircraft, or other s?iips or aircraft
on government service authorized to that effect.
Article 22
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign
merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show
its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as
the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b)
and (c) above, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's
right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under
the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspi-
cion remains after the documents have been checked, it may
proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must
be carried out with all possible consideration.
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3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided
that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying
them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may
have been sustained.
Article 23
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken
when the competent authorities of the coastal State have
good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws
and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be com-
menced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within
the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contigu-
ous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued
outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the
pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that,
at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea
or the contiguous zone received the order to stop, the ship
giving the order should likewise be within the territorial
sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship. is within
a contiguous zone, as defined in article 24 of the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the pursuit
may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the
rights for the protection of which the zone was established.
2. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship
pursued enters the territorial sea of its own country or of
a third State.
3. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the
pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means
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as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats
or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued
as a mother ship are within the limits of the territorial
sea, or as the case may be within the contiguous zone. The
pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory
signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables
it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.
4. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by
warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft
on government service specially authorized to that effect.
5. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft:
(a) The provisions of paragraph 1 to 3 of this article
shall apply mutatis mutandis
;
(b) The aircraft giving the order to stop must itself
actively pursue the ship until a ship or aircraft of the
coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take
over the pursuit, unless the aircraft is itself able to
arrest the ship. It does not suffice to justify an arrest
on the high seas that the ship was merely sighted by the
aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was
not both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself
or other aircraft or ships which continue the pursuit without
interruption.
6. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdic-
tion of a State and escorted to a port of that State for
the purposes of an enquiry before the competent authorities
may not be claimed solely on the ground that the ship, in
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the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of
the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this necessary.
7. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested on the
high seas in circumstances which do not justify the exercise
of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for any
loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained.
Article 24
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollu-
tion of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipe-
lines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of
the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing
treaty provisions on the subject.
Article 25
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution
of the seas from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking
into account any standards and regulations which may be
formulated by the competent international organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent
international organizations in taking measures for the
prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above,
resulting from any activities with radic-active materials
or other harmful agents.
Article 26
1. All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables
and pipelines on the bed of the high seas.
2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures
for the exploration of the continental shelf and the
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exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal State may
not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipe-
lines .
3. When laying such cables or pipelines the State in
question shall pay due regard to cables or pipelines already
in position on the seabed. In particular, possibilities of
repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be
prejudiced.
Article 27
Every State shall take the necessary legislative mea-
sures to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying
its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a
submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through
culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to
interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communica-
tions, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine
pipeline or high-voltage power cable shall be a punishable
offence. This provision shall not apply to any break or
injury caused by persons who acted merely with the legitimate
object of saving their lives or their ships, after having
taken all necessary precautions to avoid such break or
injury.
Article 28
Every State shall take the necessary legislative mea-
sures to provide that, if persons subject to its jurisdiction
who are the owners of a cable or pipeline beneath the high
seas, in laying or repairing that cable or pipeline, cause
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a break in or injury to another cable or pipeline, they shall
bear the cost of the repairs.
Article 29
Every State shall take the necessary legislative mea-
sures to ensure that the owners of ships who can prove that
they have sacrificed an anchor, a net or any other fishing
gear, in order to avoid injuring a submarine cable or pipe-
line, shall be indemnified by the owner of the cable or
pipeline, provided that the owner of the ship has taken all
reasonable precautionary measures beforehand.
Article 30
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect
conventions or other international agreements already in
force, as between States Parties to them.
Article 31
This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open
for signature by all States Members of the United Nations
or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other
State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations
to become a Party to the Convention.
Article 32
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instru-
ments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
Article 33
This Convention shall be open for accession by any
States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in
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article 31. The instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 34
1. This Convention shall come into force on the
thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-
second instrument of ratification or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Conven-
tion after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of
ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of
its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 35
1. After the expiration of a period of five years from
the date on which this Convention shall enter into force, a
request for the revision of this Convention may be made at
any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification
in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations
.
2. The General Assembly of the united Nations shall
decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of
such request.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
inform all States members of the United Nations and the other
States referred to in article 31:
(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit
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of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance
with articles 31, 32 and 33;
(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come
into force, in accordance with article 34;
(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article
35.
Article 37
The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof
to all States referred to in article 31.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments,
have signed this Convention.
DONE at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one.




The Soviet Concept of International Straits
Under present conditions, the legal regime of the most
important sea straits has assumed exceptional urgency due to
their great economic and strategic importance.
Over a period of many decades the great imperialist
powers have been attempting to establish control over all
international sea routes, in order to use them for important
strategic maritime communications.
The Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations are
striving to establish navigation through sea straits in
order to expand economic and cultural relations between
nations and to strengthen peace on earth.
The most critical sea straits have their own peculi-
arities from the standpoint of their legal status, navigat-
ing conditions and navigation procedures. Their strategic
and economic importance also varies.
In international law it is normally assumed that straits
which connect open seas and are of importance as world sea
routes should be open for general use. Passage of merchant
vessels and warships through these straits is not restricted,
since their legal regime is based on the principle of
Source: Barabolya, P.D., et al., Manual of International
Maritime Law
. 2 Vols. Trans, Naval Intelligence
Command. Moscow: Military Publishing Mouse of the
Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R., 1966.
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freedom of the high seas. These straits include Gibraltar,
Magellan, Taiwan, Malacca, Bab el Mandeb, etc.
The legal regime of this group of straits was estab-
lished by the 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Seas and
Contiguous Zones. According to Art. 16 of this Convention,
the contiguous State has no right to prevent innocent passage
of foreign ships through straits which serve international
navigation, since they connect one area of the high seas
with another or with the territorial waters of a foreign
State. Consequently, straits through which the principal
world sea routes pass must always be open to navigation.
In addition, there are straits which constitute the
only suitable egress from inland seas into open water basins.
A characteristic feature of these straits is the fact that
they afford passage to the shores of a limited group of
States. Thus the Black Sea straits lead to the shores of
Bulgaria, Rumania, the USSR and Turkey. The Baltic straits
(Oresund, Great Belt and Little Belt) lead to the shores of
Denmark, West Germany, East Germany, Poland, the USSR,
Finland and Sweden. The regime of the Black Sea and Baltic
Sea straits is determined by multilateral conventions.
The straits leading into the Sea of Japan (Korea,
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COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEA-BED AND THE
OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
SUB -COMMITTEE II
Article . . .
1. In straits used for international navigation between
one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas,
all ships in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of naviga-
tion, for the purpose of transit through such straits, as they
have on the high seas. Coastal States may, in the case of
narrow straits, designate corridors suitable for transit by
all slips through such straits. In the case of straits where
particular channels of navigation are customarily employed by
ships in transit, the corridors shall include such channels.
2. The freedom of navigation provided for in this article,
for the purpose of transit through the straits, shall be exer-
cised in accordance with the following rules:
(a) Ships in transit through the straits shall take all
Source: Churchill, Robin, S. Houston Lay, and Myron Nordquist
New Directions i n the Law of the Sea - Documents .




necessary steps to avoid causing any threat to the security
of the coastal States of the Straits, and in particular war-
ships in transit through such straits shall not in the area
of the straits engage in any exercises or gunfire, use weapons
of any kind, launch their aircraft, undertake hydrographical
work or engage in other acts of a nature unrelated to the
transit
;
(b) Ships in transit through the straits shall strictly
comply with the international rules concerning the prevention
of collisions between ships or other accidents and, in
straits where separate lanes are designated for the passage
of ships in each direction, shall not cross the dividing line
between the lanes. They shall also avoid making unnecessary
manoeuvres
;
(c) Ships in transit through the straits shall take pre-
cautionary measures to avoid causing pollution of the waters
and coasts of the straits, or any other kind of damage to
the coastal States of the straits;
(d) Liability for any damage which may be caused to the
coastal States of the straits as a result of the transit of
ships shall rest with the flag-State of the ship which has
caused the damage or with juridical persons under its juris-
diction or acting on its behalf;
(e) No State shall be entitled to interrupt or stop the
transit of ships through the straits, or engage therein in
any acts which interfere with the transit of ships, or
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require ships in transit to stop or communicate information
of any kind.
3. The provisions of this article:
(a) shall apply to straits lying within the territorial
waters of one or more coastal States;
(b) shall not affect the sovereign rights of the coastal
States with respect to the surface, the sea-bed and the living
and mineral resources of the straits;.
(c) shall not affect the legal regime of straits through
which transit is regulated by international agreements speci-
fically relating to such straits.
Article . . .
1. In the case of straits over which the airspace is
used for flights by foreign aircraft between one part of the
high seas and another part of the high seas, all aircraft
shall enjoy the same freedom of overflight over such straits
as they have in the airspace over the high seas. Coastal
states may designate special air corridors suitable for over-
flight by aircraft, and special altitudes for aircraft flying
in different directions, and may establish particulars for
radio-communication with them.
2. The freedom of overflight by aircraft over the
straits, as provided for in this article, shall be exercised
in accordance with the following rules:
(a) Overflying aircraft shall take the necessary steps
to keep within the boundaries of the corridors and at the
altitudes designated by the coastal States for flights over
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the straits, and to avoid overflying. the territory of a
coastal State, unless such overflight is provided for by the
delimitation of the corridor designated by the coastal
State;
(b) Overflying aircraft shall take all necessary steps
to avoid causing any threat to the security- of the coastal
States, and in particular military aircraft shall not in the
area of the straits engage in any exercises or gunfire,
use weapons of any kind, take aerial photographs, circle
or dive down towards ships, take on fuel or engage in other
acts of a nature unrelated to the overflight;
(c) Liability for any damage which may be caused to the
coastal States as a result of the overflight of aircraft
over the straits shall rest with the State to which the air-
craft that has caused the damage belongs, or with Juridical
persons under its jurisdiction or acting on its behalf;
(d) No State shall be entitled to interrupt or stop the
overflight of foreign aircraft, in accordance with this
article, in the airspace over the straits.
3. The provisions of this article:
(a) shall apply to flights by aircraft over straits
lying within the territorial waters of one or more coastal-
States
;
(b) shall not affect the legal regime of straits over
which overflight is regulated by international agreements




RULES GOVERNING ADMITTANCE OF FOREIGN WARSHIPS





The following Rules governing admittance of foreign
warships and military aircraft to Danish territory are in
effect in peacetime, in the absence of another agreement
with a foreign power, i.e., if Denmark and the foreign power
to which the warship or military aircraft in question be-
longs are in a state of peace.
Special provisions will be established to cover other
conditions. The Rules also relate to ships belonging to a
foreign power or used by that power as yachts or training
ships outside the navy.
In time of joint military exercises, the Ministry of
Defense establishes, in each individual case, the rules
governing admittance to Danish territory of warships and
aircraft participating in the exercises, in accordance with
the nature and purpose of the exercises.
Source: Barabolya, P.D., et al., Manual of International Mari
time Law . 2 Vols. Trans. Naval Intelligence Command.
Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of
Defense of the U.S.S.R., 1966, pp. 312-317.
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2Danish territory is defined in these Rules as Danish
land territory, Danish waters and Danish air space above
them.
Danish waters are defined in these Rules as the terri-
torial sea, consisting of inland waters and the outer ter-
ritorial sea.
3
Danish inland waters are defined in these Rules as
harbors, harbor entrances, roadsteads, bays and fjords, as
well as part of the Danish territorial sea within and be-
tween Danish islands, spits and reefs which are not perman-
ently under water. In the Great Belt and The Sound, however,
Danisli inland territorial waters are confined to harbors,
harbor entrances, bays, fjords and areas of the Great Belt
and The Sound specifically indicated in the second part of
this paragraph and in Sec. 4.
In addition to the closed waters indicated in Sec. 4,
the inland territorial waters consist of the following:
Copenhagen Roadstead, bounded on the north by a line
from Taarbaek Harbor to the lighted and acoustic buoy to the
east, along a line from the latter buoy to the northermost
point of Saltholm, from there along the west coast of
Saltholm to the southermost point of Saltholm; and bounded
on the south by a line from the latter point to Drogden
Lighthouse, from there to the "Af landshage" marker, and from
there along a line to the Sjaelland coast in the direction
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of Vallensbaek Church on Sjaelland Island.
Helsingjrfr port and roadstead, bounded by a 56° 03' N.
from the coastline to the Lappegrund marker, from the
Lappegrund marker to 56° 02' 6" N., 12° 38' 0" E., pass-
ing through this point to 56° 01' 7" N., a line from this
point to 56° 01' N., 12° 37' E., and a parallel passing
through this point to the coastline.
Frederikshavn port and port area, bounded by a parallel
passing through Hirsholm Lighthouse from the coastline to
the lighthouse, and from there by a line to 57° 25' 3" N.,
10° 36' 0" E. (point 6 in course 35), through a meridian
passing through this point to 57° 22' 0", and through a
parallel passing through this point to the coastline.
The Ease Jutland fjords.
The waters between the southern part of Jutland and the
islands of Brands^, BagjzS and Arp.
The waters between the southern part of Jutland and the
line Halk Hoved-Bars$ east point-Tontof t Nakke.
Part of Sonderborg Bugt, which is bounded to the
south by a line from Lille Borreshoved to "Heltsbanke"
marker, from there to "Middelgrund" marker, and from there
to the cape at S^nderby on Kegnaes.
Part of the water expanse to the south from Egernsund,
bounded on the south by a line from the front Rinkenaes Light




The waters between the Okse^er islands, and also between
these islands and S^nderhav.
The West Jutland Fjords.
Odense Fjord.
The waters to the west and north of the line Hassens^r-
Sams^-Endelave-Bj ^rnsknude
.
Nakskov Fjord, bounded on the northwest by the line Albuen
Lighthouse-Tcirs Vig.
The waters within the line Hov (on Langeland Island)
-
Vresen-Knudshoved (on Fyn)-.
Korsor Roadstead, bounded on the west by a meridian
passing through Halsskov Odde, and on the south by 55° 19'
N. Parallel.
The waters to the east of the line Halsskov-Musholm-
ReesgS.
Kalundborg Fjord, bounded on the west by a line the
westernmost points of which are Rosnaes and Asnaes.
Bays and fjords in the Faeroe Islands.
4
Closed waters consist of the following inland waters:
Isefjord and the entrance to it, bounded on the west by
the line Tybor^n Church-Agger Beacon, and on the east by
the line Nordmandshage-Egensehage
.
The waters of Smaaland with the following entrances:




The waters between Om0 and Lolland, bounded on the west
by the line Omo' Harbor-Ons^.
Guldborg Sund, bounded on the south by the line Hyllekrog
Lighthouse-Gedser Lighthouse. Gr^nsund, bounded on the south
east by the following lines: a parallel between Hestehoved
Lighthouse and 12° 14' 5" E., Meridian.
B^gestrom, bounded on the northeast by the following
lines: a parallel passing through the rear Ronsklint Beacon
and a meridian passing through the northern cape of Ulvshale.
Als Sund, bounded on the south by Klinting Hoved and the
northern part of the Vemmingbund.
Als Fjord, bounded on the north by the line Nordborg
Lighthouse-Varnaes Hoved.
The waters to the south of Fyn, with the following
entrances
:
The waters between Langeland and Fyn, bounded on the
north by a parallel passing through Hov Lighthouse.
The waters between Langeland and Aer$, bounded on the
southwest by the following lines: a parallel passing through
Ristinge Church and a meridian passing through Marstal Church
The waters between Aero' and LyjzS and the waters between




Foreign warships may pass through or sojourn in Danish
waters, but with the exceptions and restrictions indicated
in the following paragraphs.
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If passage through or sojourn in Danish waters involves
more than two days, prior notification must be given through
diplomatic channels. This notification as well as the noti-
fication indicated in Sees. 7 and 8, must be given not less
than eight days prior to the proposed passage or sojourn.
7
Foreign warships may pass through or sojourn in the
inland sea, as well as in the Danish territorial waters of
the Little Belt, provided that prior notification is given
through diplomatic channels.
For fishery inspection vessels, belonging to States
with which Denmark has concluded a fishing agreement and
which are supervising fishing in waters washing the Faeroe
Islands, all that is required is notification once a year
through diplomatic channels for admittance to Danish inland
territorial waters in the Faeroe Islands.
8
Foreign warships may visit or pass through the ports
and port areas of Frederikshavn and Helsing^r, as well as
the roadstead and port of Copenhagen, if prior approval is
received through diplomatic channels or, if it is only a
question of passage through Hollaenderdybet and Drodgen,
prior notification through diplomatic channels.
9
Notification and approval, as indicated in Sees. 6, 7
and 8, are not required for:
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a) warships belonging to States having fishing
agreements with Denmark and which are supervising fishing,
if it involves ports and anchorage sites on the west coast
of Jutland and the port of Skagen;
b) warships in distress.
10
The inland territorial waters referred to in Sec. 4
are closed to foreign warships, and permission to pass through
these waters or sojourn in them is ordinarily given only to
warships in distress.
11
If more than three foreign warships of a single nation-
ality plan to sojourn simultaneously in Danish waters within
the same naval district, or if the sojourn of foreign war-
ships in Danish waters, irrespective of the number of war-
ships, extends beyond four days, prior approval must be
obtained through diplomatic channels.
In Danish waters, foreign naval ships may not make
measurements or conduct military exercises, such as firing
guns, rockets or torpedoes, minelaying, minesweeping , laying
smoke screens or artificial fogs, or exercises involving
armed vessels , landing armed forces, etc.
Foreign submarines must be surfaced while in Danish




ROYAL DECREE WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT OF FOREIGN
WARSHIPS AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO CALL IN
SWEDISH TERRITORY IN PEACETIME
8 June 1951
The Government of His Royal Majesty has adopted a
resolution according to which, on the one hand, Art. 4,
Par. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Arts. 6 and 7, as well as Art. 8, Par. 1
of the Decree of 21 November 1925 with respect to the right
of foreign warships and military aircraft to call in Swedish
territory in peacetime will be amended as indicated by
following texts, and, on the other hand, Art. 5 of the afore




The provisions of this Decree regarding the right of
foreign warships and military aircraft to call in Swedish
territory are applicable only when Sweden and the foreign
power to which the warship or military aircraft belongs are
in a state of peace.
Otherwise special provisions must be applied.
Source: Barabolya, P.D., et al., Manual of Internationa l
Marit ime Law. 2 Vols. Trans. Naval Intelligence
Command . Moscow: Military Publishing House of





Swedish territory is defined in the present Decree as




1. Foreign warships may call:
a) in waters which may not be associated with naval
ports, after permission is obtained through diplomatic
channels, provided that in certain special cases there was
no other authorization;
b) in other Swedish territorial waters without
permission; warships do not have the right to stop in these
waters or anchor, unless required for the safety of the ship
2. Authorizations provided for in Para. l,a are not
required for any warship:
a) carrying a Chief of a foreign State or his
official representative;
b) escorting a ship referred to in Para. l,a of
this Article, but with the exception provided for in Article
7 with respect to the number of ships; or
c) ships in distress.
3. If a foreign military vessel in distress enters the
territorial waters referred to in Para. l,a or if such a
ship stops or drops anchor in other Swedish territorial
waters in a case provided for in Par. l,b the master of the
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ship must inform the commanding officer of the naval district
in question of his arrival as quickly as possible. This
information will be communicated to personnel of the pilot
service, lighthouse tenders or customs or coastal inspec-
tion personnel. If this communication cannot be made, it
must be conveyed immediately through diplomatic channels.
Article 7
Unless the authorization obtained through diplomatic
channels indicates otherwise, a maximum of three warships
of the same power may sojourn simultaneously in the same
naval district, Swedish naval port, or in Swedish territorial
waters not comprising part of any naval ports.
Article 8
1. When a foreign warship is in a Swedish naval port
or in inland waters of Sweden not comprising part of any
naval ports, the commanding officer of the warship must use
only those passages and fairways indicated in an updated
list of fairways and, in the absence of provisions to the
contrary, in such a case must utilize the services of a
pilot designated by the Swedish Government.
2. In calling at a port in Swedish territorial waters,
foreign submarines must be surfaced and their national colors
must always be visible, unless this is impossible due to
unusual circumstances.
Article 9
During visits to a Swedish port by a foreign warship,
the commanding officer of the warship, in selecting an
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anchorage or mooring site or with respect to other circum-
stances, must observe instructions issued by the commander
of the naval district for each naval port, with the exception
of Faerosund, where instructions are issued by the commanding
officer of the coastal defense of Gotland, and instructions
which are not issued by competent port authorities in naval
ports.
Article 10
If the competent naval authorities referred to in
Article 9 deem it necessary, they have the right, together
with the commanding officer of the foreign warship, to
develop more precise provisions with respect to the number
of crew members of the warship entitled to shore leave in a
naval port area or authorization for any other purpose, and





In the application for permission, in accordance with
Article 6 or Article 11, there must be an indication of the
number of warships or military aircraft taking part in the
visit, the type of vessles and aircraft involved and other
data required for their identification, the proposed route
through Swedish territory, the place or places they have
decided to visit, the approximate date of the beginning and
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end of the visit and, for warships carrying aircraft, the
number and type, and, for aircraft equipped with radio sets,
the call signs for these airplanes in the event of radio
communication.
If permission is obtained, the date of arrival must be
communicated.
Article 15
Foreign warships and military aircraft may not remain
more than 14 days without special permission, obtained through
diplomatic channels.
Article 16
The commanding officer of any foreign warship or military
aircraft in Swedish territory must observe directives issued
by competent authorities with respect to sanitary service,
pilot service, customs, trade and port regulations and regu-
lations governing the social order.
Article 17
1. The following activities are prohibited on Swedish
territory: mapping or hydrographic surveys or measurements
aboard foreign warships or military aircraft or by their
crews, with the exception, however, of measurements which
might be necessary to assure safety of the ship. It is
also prohibited, without special permission, to fire guns,-
launch torpedoes or engage in other types of firing, mine-
laying exercises, minesweeping or other underwater operations
or landing exercises. Detachments may be sent ashore for
military funerals, and only under the aforementioned conditions,
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after permission is obtained from competent military-
officials
.
2. Special decrees have been issued on the use of wire-
less telegraphy within the Kingdom.
3. Boats belonging to foreign warships or military
aircraft on Swedish territory must not be armed, and must
not transport personnel under conditions other than those <
specified in Pa*ra. 1.
4. Crewmembers of foreign warships and military air-
craft on shore leave must be unarmed, although officers and
NCOs may carry silent weapons as part of their uniform.
. Article 18
1. If the commanding officer or a crewmember of a
foreign warship or military aircraft does not observe the
provisions of this Decree, this must be brought to the atten-
tion of the military authorities of the naval port indicated
in Article 13 of that Decree in the case of an air force
base, and in all other cases to the senior military officers
at the given point or, if there are no military authorities
at that point, to civil authorities.
If this does not yield results, the warship or military
aircraft is ordered by the aforementioned military or civil
authorities, if the King so decides, to leave Swedish
territory immediately or within 6 hours, even if the duration
of the stay has not expired.
2. Foreign warships and military aircraft may be ordered,
in accordance with Para. 1, to leave Swedish territory if the
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King so decides, even if the circumstances indicated in
Para. 1 do not obtain.
This Decree comes into force the day after the day in
which the aforementioned Decree, according to notification,
is published and placed in the official register of Swedish
laws and resolutions.
All parties to whom the present Decree is applicable
must carefully observe its provisions.
8 June 1951




CONVENTION REGARDING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS,
SIGNED AT MONTREUX, JULY 20, 1936.
(MONTREUX CONVENTION)
Article 1 . -- The High Contracting Parties recognise and
affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation
by sea in the Straits.
The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regu-
lated by the provisions of the present Convention.
SECTION I. --Merchant Vessels
Article 2 . -- In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy
complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits,
by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of
cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in Article
3 below. No taxes or charges other than those authorised by
Annex I to the present Convention shall be levied by the
Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit
without calling at a port in the Straits.
In order to facilitate the collection of these taxes or
charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits shall
communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in
Article 3 their name, nationality, tonnage, destination and
last port of call (provenance)
.
Source: The Problem of the Turkish Straits
,
Department of
State Publication 2752, Near Eastern Series 5,




Pilotage and towage remain optional.
Article 3 . -- All ships entering the Straits by the Aegean
Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station
near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the
sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the frame-
work of international sanitary regulations. This control,
in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of health or
presenting a declaration of health testifying that they do
not fall within the scope of the provisions of the second
paragraph of the present article, shall be carried out by
day and by night with all possible speed, and the vessels in
question shall not be required to make any other stop during
their passage through the Straits.
Vessels which have on board cases of plague, cholera,
yellow fever i exanthematic typhus or smallpox, or which have
had such cases on board during the previous seven days, and
vessels which have left an infected port within less than
five times twenty-four hours shall stop at the sanitary
stations indicated in the preceding paragraph in order to
embark such sanitary guards as the Turkish authorities may
direct. No tax or charge shall be levied in respect to these
sanitary guards and they shall be disembarked at a sanitary
station on departure from the Straits.
Article 4 . -- In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent,
merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of cargo,
shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits
subject to the provisions of Articles 2 and 3.
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Pilotage and towage remain optional.
Article 5
.
-- In time of war, Turkey being belligerent,
merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with
Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the
Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist
the enemy.
Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their
transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each
case be indicated by the Turkish authorities.
Article 6. -- Should Turkey consider herself to be threat-
ened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of Article
2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except that
vessels must enter the Straits by day and that their transit
must be effected by the route which shall, in each case,
be indicated by the Turkish authorities.
Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no
charge shall be levied.
Article 7 . -- The term "merchant vessels" applies to all
vessels which are not covered by Section II of the present
Convention.
SECTION II. --Vessels of War
Article 8 . -- For the purposes of the present Convention,
the definitions of vessels of war and of their specification
together with those relating to the calculation of tonnage
shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.
Article 9 . -- Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed
for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not be
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subject to the provisions of Article 13 regarding notifica-
tion, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculat-
ing the tonnage which is subject to limitation under Articles
14 and 18, on condition that they shall pass through the
Straights singly. They shall, however, continue to be on the
same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of the remain-
ing provisions governing transit.
The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph
shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status
therein contemplated if their armament, does not include: for
use against floating targets, more than two guns of a maxi-
mum calibre of 105 millimetres; for use against aerial tar-
gets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 75
millimetres
.
Article 10 . -- In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor
war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black
Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag, shall
enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any
taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is
begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid
down in Article 13 and the articles following thereafter.
Vessels of war other than those which fall within the
categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only
enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions pro-
vided by Articles 11 and 12.
Art icle 11 . -- Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits
capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in
184

the first paragraph of Article 14, on condition that these
vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more
than two destroyers.
Article 12 . -- Black Sea Powers shall have the right to send
through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their
base, submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black
Sea, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or
purchase of such submarines shall have been given to Turkey.
Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be
entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dock-
yards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed
information on the matter is given to Turkey.
In either case, the said submarines must travel by day
and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits
singly.
Article 15 . - - The transit of vessels of war through the
Straits shall be preceded by notification given to the
Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The
normal period of notice shall be eight days; but it is de-
sirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this
period should be increased to fifteen days. The notifica-
tion shall specify the destination, name, type and number
of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward-
passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any
change of date shall be subject to three days' notice.
Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall
take place within a period of five days from the date
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given in the original notification. After the expiry of
this period, a new notification shall be given under the
same conditions as for the original notification.
When effecting transit, the commander of the naval
force shall , without being under any obligation to stop,
communicate to a signal station at the entrance to the
Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the
force under his orders.
Article 14 . -- The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign
naval forces which may be in course of transit through the
Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases
provided for in Article 11 and in Annex III to the present
Convention.
The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall
not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.
Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black
Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 17, shall not be
included in this tonnage.
Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage
during their passage through the Straits be included in this
tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall by
subject to any special provisions relating to security laid
down by Turkey.
Article 15 . -- Vessels of war in transit through the Straits
shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which
they may be carrying.
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Article 16 . -- Vessels of war in transit through the Straits
shall not, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea,
remain therein longer than is necessary for them to effect
the passage.
Article 17 . -- Nothing in the provisions of the preceding
articles shall prevent a naval force of any tonnage or com-
position from paying a courtesy visit of limited duration
to a port in the Straits, at the invitation of the Turkish
Government. Any such force must leave the Straits by the
same route as that by which it entered, unless it fulfills
the conditions required for passage in transit through the
Straits as laid down by Articles 10, 14, and 18.
Article 18 . -- (1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black
Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be
limited as follows:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the
aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed
30,000 tons;
(b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet
in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the
tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of
the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate
tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall
be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of 45,000
tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power shall, in
conformity with Annex IV to the present Convention, inform
the Turkish Government, on the 1st January and the 1st July
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of each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in the
Black Sea; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this
information to the other High Contracting Parties and to
the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
(c) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power may
have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of
the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and
(b) above;
(d) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black
Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black
Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces, which
shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be
allowed to enter the Black Sea without having to give
the notification provided in Article ii of the present
Convention, provided an authorisation is obtained from
the Turkish Government in the following circumstances: if
the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs
(a) and (b) above has not been reached and will not be
exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is desired
to send, the Turkish Government shall grant the said auth-
orisation within the shortest possible time after receiving
the request which has been addressed to it; if the said
figure has already been reached or if the despatch of the
forces which it is desired to send will cause it to be
exceeded, the Turkish Government will immediately inform
the other Black Sea Powers of the request for authorisation,
and if the said Powers make no objection within twenty-four
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hours of having received this information, the Turkish
Govenrment shall, within twenty- four hours at the latest,
inform the interested Powers of the reply which it has
decided to make to their request.
Any further entry into the Black Sea of naval forces
of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within the
available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for
in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.
(2) Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers
shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days,
whatever be the object of their presence there.
Article 19 . -- In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent,
warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navi-
gation through the Straits under the same conditions as those
laid down in Articles 10 to 13.
Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not,
however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising
out of the application of Article 25 of the present Conven-
tion, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim
of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance
binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and pub-
lished in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of
the Covenant.
In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding
paragraph, the limitations laid down in Articles 10 to 18
of the present Convention shall not be applicable.
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Notwithstanding the prohibition of passage laid down
in paragraph 2 above, vessels of war belonging to belligerent
Powers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which have
become separated from their bases, may return thereto.
Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not
make any capture, exercise the right of visit and search, or
carry out any hostile act in the Straits.
Article 20 . -- In time of war, Turkey being belligerent,
the provisions of Articles 10 to 18 shall not be applicable;
the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the dis-
cretion of the Turkish Government.
Article 21 . -- Should Turkey consider herself to be threat-
ened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right
to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the present Convention
Vessels which have passed through the Straits before
Turkey has made use of the powers conferred upon her by the
preceding paragraph, and which thus find themselves separated
from their bases, may return thereto. It is, however, under-
stood that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of war
belonging to the State whose attitude has given rise to the
application of the present article.
Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers
conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a
notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High




If the Council of the League of Nations decide by a
majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by
Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the
opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties
signatories to the present Convention, the Turkish Govern-
ment undertakes to discontinue the measures in question
as also any measures which may have been taken under
Article 6 of the present Convention.
Article 22 . -- Vessels of war which have on board cases
of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or
smallpox or which have had such cases on board within the
last seven days and vessels of war which have left an
infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours
must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply by
the means on board such prophylactic measures as are neces-
sary in order to prevent any possibility of the Straits
being infected.
SECTION III. --Aircraft
Article 23 . -- In order to assure the passage of civil air-
craft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the
Turkish Government will indicate the air routes available
for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which may be
established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use these
routes provided that they give the Turkish Government, as
regards occasional flights, a notification of three days,
and as regards flights on regular services, a general notifi
cation of the dates of passage.
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The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations and to the High Contracting
Parties an annual report giving details regarding the move-
ments of foreign vessels of war through the Straits and
furnishing all information which may be of service to
commerce and navigation, both by sea and by air, for which
provision is made in the present Convention.
Article 25 . -- Nothing in the present Convention shall pre-
judice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of
the other High Contracting Parties members of the League of
Nations, arising out of the Covenant of the League of
Nations
.
SECTION V. --Final Provisions
Article 26 . -- The present Convention shall be ratified as
soon as possible.
The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives
of the Government of the French Republic in Paris.
The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform the
Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic
representative in Paris that the ratification has been given,
and in that case they shall transmit the instrument of rati-
fication as soon as possible.
A proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications shall be
drawn up as soon as six instruments of ratification, in-
cluding that of Turkey, shall have been deposited. For
this purpose the notification provided for in the preceding
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paragraph shall be taken as the equivalent of the deposit of
an instrument of ratification.
The present Convention shall come into force on the date
of the said proces-verbal .
The French Government will transmit to all the High
Contracting Parties an authentic copy of the proces-verbal
provided for in the preceding paragraph and of the proces-
verbaux of the deposit of any subsequent ratifications.
Article 27 . -- The present Convention shall, as from the
date of its entry into force, be open to accession by any
Power signatory to the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne signed
on the 24th July, 1923.
Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic
channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and by
the latter to all the High Contracting Parties.
Accessions shall come into force as from the date of
notification to the French Government.
Article 28 . -- The present Convention shall remain in force
for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.
The principles of freedom of transit and navigation
affirmed in Article 1 of the present Convention shall how-
ever continue without limit of time.
If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of
twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given
notice of denunciation to the French Government the present
Convention shall continue in force until two years after
such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall
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be communicated by the French Government to the High Contract
ing Parties.
In the event of the present Convention being denounced
in accordance with the provisions of the present article,
the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at
a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.
Article 29 . --At the expiry of each period of five years
from the date of the entry into force of the present Con-
vention each of the High Contracting Parties shall be
entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of
the provisions of the present Convention.
To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one
of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the
case of modifications to Articles 14 to 18, by one other
High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications
to any other article, by two other High Contracting Parties.
Any request for revision thus supported must be notified
to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to
the expiry of the current period of five years. This noti-
fication shall contain details of the proposed amendments
and the reasons which have given rise to them.
Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on
these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High
Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference
to be summoned for this purpose.
Such a conference may only take decisions by a unani-
mous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving
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Articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters
of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.
The said majority shall include three-quarters of the
High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, includ




DECLARATION OF- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF INDONESIA ON ITS TERRITORIAL SEA
13 December 1957
From a geographical point of view, Indonesia, which is
an archipelago consisting of thousands of islands, has its
own distinguishing characteristics.
In order to assure the territorial integrity and pro-
tection of the resources of the State of Indonesia, the
entire archipelago and the waters between its islands must
be regarded as a single entity.
The limits of the territorial sea indicated in Decree
No. 442 (1939) on the territorial sea and naval districts,
Art. 1, do not agree with the above, since the land territory
of Indonesia is divided into areas separated from its
territorial sea.
On the basis of the above considerations, the Govern-
ment declares that all of the waters around and between the
islands comprising Indonesia, irrespective of their breadth
and extent, are an integral part of the land territory of
Indonesia and are thus part of the inland waters or national
Source: Barabolya, P.D., et al., Manual of International
Maritime Law
.
2 Vols. Trans. Naval Intelligence
Command. Moscow: Military Publishing House of the




waters, under the exclusive sovereignty of Indonesia.
Innocent passage of foreign ships in the inland waters is
assured, as long as they do not violate the sovereignty
and security of the State of Indonesia.
The limits of the territorial sea (with a breadth of
12 nautical miles) are measured from a line connecting the




WIDTHS OF SELECTED STRAITS AND CHANNELS
Passage Sovereignty Ccogiaph'ual situation
ANGLO-AMERICA
Robeson Channel .... Canada/Denmark . . . Between Ellesmere Island and Green^
land.
Hudson Strait Canada Entrance to Hudson Bay
Strait of Belle Isle .... Canada Between Labrador and Newfound-
land.
Jacques Cartier Passage . Canada Between Quebec Coast and Anticosti
Island.
Gaspe Passage Canada Between Anticosti Island and Gasp6
Peninsula.









Source: Churchill, Robin, S. Houston Lay, and Myron Nordquist
New Directions in the Law of the Sea - Documents.








Northumberland Strait . .
Florida Strait
Santa Barbara Channel








Canada Between Newfoundland and Cape
Breton Island.
Canada Between New Brunswick and Prince
Edward Island.
United States/Cuba . . Between Key West and Cuba . . . .
United States Between Channel Islands and Cali-
fornia Coast.
United States/Canada . South of Vancouver Island
Canada Between Queen Charlotte Islands and
Mainland.
United States/Canada . Between Alexander Archipelago and
Queen Charlotte Islands.
United States Aleutian Islands: West of Arnukta
Island.
United States Aleutian Islands: West of Unimak
Island.
United States Between Alaska Peninsula and Kodiak
Island.



























Mona Passage . . .






See footnote! at end of Ublc


















Between Cuba and Yucatan Peninsula . * 105
Bahamas: Southwest of Great Abaco . 26
Bahamas: Between Great Abaco * 29
Island and Eleuthera,
Bahamas: Between Long Island and 26
Crooked Island.
Bahamas: Between Acklins Island * 39
and Mayaguana Island.
Bahamas Area: Between Mayaguana 35
Island and Caicos Islands.
Between Cuba and Hispaniola .... 45
Between Turks Islands and Caicos 13
Islands.
Near Turks Islands 23
Between Dominican Republic and 33
Mona Island (P.R.).
"
Between Culebra (P.R.) and Virgin 7 8
Islands.
Between Anegada and Sombrero ... * 48
Between Guadeloupe and Montscrrat . 28
Between Marie Galantc (Guadeloupe) 16
and Dominica.





St. Lucia Channel . .
St. Vincent Passage .
Dragon's Mouth . . .
Serpent's Mouth . .
Aruba-Paraguana
Passage.
Estrecho de la Maire
.
Strait of Magellan . .
France/United
Kingdom.













Between Martinique and St. Lucia
. . 17
Between St. Lucia and St. Vincent
. . 23
Between Trinidad (Chacachacare 6
Island) and Peninsula of Paria.
Between Trinidad and Coast of 8
Venezuela.
Between Aruba and Paraguana 15
Peninsula.
Between Tierra del Fuego and Isla de 16
los Estados.





Karpathos Strait . . .
Kisos Strait
Strait of Otranto . . .
Strait of Messina . . .
Malta Channel . . . .
Strait of Sicily ....




Strait of Bonificio . . .
Freu de Minorca . . .
Strait of Gibraltar . . .
Strait of Dover ....
Turkey . . .
Turkey . . .
Greece . . .






Between Turkey in Europe and
Anatolia.
Between Gallipoli Peninsula and
Anatolia.
Dodecanese: Between Karpathos and
Rhodes.
Dodecanese: Between Kisos and
Crete.
Between Albania and Italian
Peninsula.
Between Sicily and Italian Peninsula .
Between Malta (Gozo) and Sicily . ,
Between Pantelleria and Sicily . . . .
Between Elba and Italian Peninsula








Morocco/Spain . . .
France/United
Kingdom.
United Kingdom . .
Ireland/United
Kingdom.
United Kingdom . .
United Kingdom . .
United Kingdom . .
Between Corsica and Sardinia . .
Between Majorca and Minorca
Between Morocco and Spain . .
Between England and France . .
Between Isle of Wight and English
Mainland.
Between Ireland and Wales . . .
Between Northern Ireland and
Scodand.
Between Outer Hebrides and Island
of Skyc.


























Pcntland Firth United Kingdom





Kalmar Sund Sweden ....
Entrance to Gulf of
Bothnia.








Between Orkneys and Mainland of " 5
Scodand.
Between Orkneys and Shedand Islands 23
(Fair Isle).
Between Denmark (Jutland) and 61
Norway.
Between Sjaelland and Sweden ... 2
Between Bornholra and Sweden ... 19
Between Oland Island and Swedish 2
Mainland.
Between Aland Islands and Sweden . u 17
Between Estonia and Finland .... 17
FAR EAST




Taraku Suido . .
Notsuke .......
Soya Kaikyo (La Perouse
Strait).
Tsugara Kaikyo ....
Eastern Chosen Strait .
Western Chosen Strait . ,


















Osumi Kaikyo (Van Japan
Dieman Strait).
Tokara Kaikyo (Colnett Japan
Strait).
China
P'cnghu Shuitao (Pesca- China
dores Channel).
See footnotes at end of table.
Between Kamchatka and Kuril 6
Islands.
Between Etorofu and Uruppu .... 22
Between Etorofu and Kunashira ... 12
Between Shikotan and Taraku 12
(Habomai Islands).
Habomai Island: Between Taraku and 6
Shibotsu.
Between Hokkaido and Kunashira . . 9
Between Hokkaido and Sakhalin ... u 23
Between Honshu and Hokkaido ... 10
Between Iki (Off coast of Kyushu) and 25
Tsushima.
Between Korea and Tsushima .... M 23
Off Southern Coast of Korea (Cheju 12
Do to Haem So).
Off Southwest Coast of Korea (Maemul 13
To to Yongsan Do).
Off Southwest Coast of Korea .... 8
Entrance to Pohai Bay 22
Between Kyushu and Ryukyus . ... 16
Ryukyus: Between Osumi Gunto and 22
Tokara Gunto.
Between Taiwan and Mainland Cliina . '* 74












Between Hong Kong and Leraa 6
Islands.
Between Hainan Island and Mainland 10
China.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Babuyan Channel .... Philippines
Polillo Strait Philippines
Maqueda Channel .... Philippines
Verde Island Passage . . . Philippines
San Bernardino Passage
.







Bangka Pascage Indonesia .
Selat Grehund Indonesia
Makassar Strait Indonesia
Koti Passage Indonesia ....
Serasan Passage Indonesia ....
Api Passage Indonesia ....
Selat Ombai Indonesia/Portugal
Selat Roti Indonesia ....
Selat Sape Indonesia ....
Selat Alas Indonesia ....
Selat Lombok Indonesia ....
Selat Bali Indonesia ....




Strait of Malacca (North) . Indonesia/Malaysia
Strait of Malacca (South) . Indonesia/Malaysia
Sec footnotes at end of table.
Between Babuyan Islands and Luzon
. 15
Between Polillo Island and Luzon . . 10
Between Cataduanes and Luzon ... 4
Between Luzon and Mindoro (Verde u 4
Island to Mindoro).
Between Luzon and Samar 8
Between Calamian Islands and Min- ,: 20
dom Mrorn A r*n T to cuterrnoc t of
Calamian Islands).
Between Leytc and Mindanao .... 10
Between Mindanao and Sulu 7
Archipelago.
Between Palawan and Sabah (Island ,e 27
of Eomeo).
In Sulu Archipelago near Borneo . . 18
Between Bangka Island and offshore 19
islands to north.
Between offshore islands of Celebes to 10
cast.
Between Borneo and Celebes (without " 62
regard to offshore islands).
Off northwest coast of Borneo .... 10
Off northwest coast of Borneo .... 23
Off northwest coast of Borneo .... 16
Between Alor and Portuguese Timor . 16
Between Roti and Timor 6
Between Komoda and Sumbawa ... 8
Between Lombok and Sumbawa ... 5
Between Bali and Lombok 11
Between Bali and Java 2
Between Java and Sumatra (not taking 12
into account Pulau Sangiang in
middle of strait).
Between Bangka and Billiton .... * 8
Between Bangka and Sumatra .... 8
Between Singkep and Sumatra .... "9
Between Malaysia and Sumatra ... 20















Apolima Strait . .
Indispensable Strait .
Manning Strait . . .
Bougainville Strait . .
St. George's Channel
Goschen Strait . . .
Dampier Strait . . .
Vitiaz Strait . . . .
Cook Strait
















Australia . . . .
Australia . . . .
Australia . . . .
Australia . . . .
New Zealand . .
Australia . . . .




Between Hawaii and Maui 25
Between Kahoolawe and Maui ... 6
Between Kahoolawe and LanaL ... 15
Between Lanai and Maui 8
Between Molokai and Maui 8
Between Lanai and Molokai 8
Between Oahu and Moloaki 22
Between Kauai and Oahu 63
Between Kauai and Niihau 15
Between Savai'i and Upolu (not taking 4
into account Apolima Island in center
of strait).
Between Guadalcanal and Malaita . . ** 19
Between Choisel and Santa Isabel . . 6
Between Bougainville and Choiseul . . 15
Between New Britain and New Ire- 8
land.
Between New Guinea and D'Entrecas- 7
teaux Islands.
Between New Britain and Umboi . . 13
Between New Guinea and Bismarck 24
Archipelago.
Between North Island and South 12
Island.
Between Australia and offshore islands 8
(near Tasmania).





Strait of Hormoz Iron/Muscat and Oman
Between Novaya ZemJya and Ostrov
Vaygach.
Through Adams Bridge
Entrance to Persian Gulf





• Entrance to Hudson Strait between Resolution Island
and Button Islands (off Labrador Coast), 37 miles.
• Distance between Bimini (Bahamas) and Florida, 43
miles.
• Distance given in table is that between Big Diomede
Island (U.S.S.R.) and Mainland Siberia. Other distances:
(1) Between Little Diomede Island (U.S.) and Big Diomede
Island, 2 miles (2) Between Little Diomede Island and
Mainland Alaska, 2o miles. (3) Between Mainland Alaska
•Jid Mainland Siberia, 45 males.
• Distance given is that from Contoy, an island about 6
miles off the Yucatan coast.
• Distance between Great Abaco Island and Royal Island,
off Elcutricra coast, 26 miles).
•Distance between Acklins Island and Plana Cayt, 12
miles; between Plana Cays and Mayaguana Island, 21
miles.
' Distance given in table is from Culebrita, an islet east
of Culebra.
1 Distance between Sombrero and Horse Shoe Reef, a
breaking reef running southeast of Anegada and attached
thereto, is 42 miles.
'•Less than a nautical mile.
•Distance given in table is between mainlands; between
South Bishop Rock (Wales) and Tuskax Rock (Ireland),
36 miles.
»• Between Shianl Island and mainland of Scotland,
17 miles.
•' Between Pcotland Skerries and mainland of Scotland,
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4 miles. Stroma Island, which also lies in Pentland Firth,
Is Dot considered in the computation.
" Distance given in table approximately correct; several
small islands in strait makes precise measurements difficult.
B Distance between Hokkaido and Ostrov Kamen'
Opasnosli, 20 miles; on to Sakhalin, 9 miles.
•« Measured from island off the coast of Korea.
•» Distance is 68 miles if offshore islands are taken into
consideration.
•• Distance between Luzon and Verde Island, 3 miles.
" Distance between Mindoro to Apo Reef, 15 miles.
'* Distance given in table is that measured between
Balabac, largest of the major islands south of Palawan,
and Balambangan, closest of the major islands of Sabah.
M Distance between Borneo and Pulau Tug\ian, 55 miles.
* Dbtance given in table is that measured across Mac-
clesfield Strait portion of Caspar Strait.
>' Distance from Sumatra to Bcrhala, in middle of (trait,
9 milci; from Berhala to Singkep, 10 miles.
" Distance given in table is that measured between
Malaita and Nura Islands, the latter 10 miles from Guadal-
canal.
o Distance between Centre Island (4 miles off South
Island) and Stewart Island 3t west end of strait, 13 miles.
At east end of strait the recommended channel for ship*
between Dog Island on the north and Ruapuke on the
south, the channel is 1 1 miles wide.
" Distance given in table is between mainlands; between
Perim Island and African continent, 11 miles; between




1. Barabolya, P.D., et al., Manual of. International Maritime
Law. 2 vols. Trans. Naval Intelligence Command. Moscow:
Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of
USSR, 1966.
2. Blechman, Barry M.
,
The Changing Soviet Navy . staff paper,
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973.
3. Brittin, Burdick H. , and Liselotte B. Watson, International







Naval Institute Press, 1972.
4
.
Bruel, Erik, T nternational Straits- -A Treatise on Inter -
national Law . 2 vols. London: Sweet q Maxwell , Ltd.
,
1947.
5. Butler, William Elliot, The Soviet Union and the Law of
the Sea . Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
6. Churchill, Robin, S. Houston Lay, and Myron Nordquist.
New Directions in the Law of the Se a - Do cuments . 2 vols.
Bobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1973.
7. Colombos, C. John, The International Law of the Se a. 4th
ed. , London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1959.
8 Columbia L ip rn.ncott Gazateer of the World, The . Morning-
side Heights, N.Y. : Columbia University Press, 1952.
9. Daniel, Donald C . F . , and Mark W. Janis, "The USSR: Ocean
Use and Ocean Law." Occasional Paper #21, Law of the Se a
Institute . University of Rhode Island, May 1974.
10. Daniel, Donald C.F., "Navies as Instuments of Foreign
Policy." unpublished paper. Monterey, Calif.: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1974.
11. Dudley, H.G., "The Future Role of Soviet Seapower."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1966, pp. 39-49.
12. Friedman, Wolfgang, The Future of the Oceans . New York:
George Brazillier, Inc., 1971.
13. Gorshkov, S.G., "Navies in War and Peace." Russian Naval
Digest (Morskoy Sbornik) , 1972, reprinted in U.S. Naval
"





14. Griswold, Lawrence, "Base Necessities; The World Lineup."
Sea Power
,
Aug. 1974, pp. 16-21.'
15. Griswold, Lawrence, "Garuda and the Emerald Archipelago."
Sea Power
,
Feb. 1973, pp. 20-25.




17. Griswold, Lawrence, "The Chokepoint War." Sea Power .
Jul. 1973, pp. 11-17.
18. Griswold, Lawrence, "The Cork in the Baltic Bottle."
Sea Power . Jan. 1972, pp. 9-13.
19. Henkin, Louis, "Changing Laws for the Changing Seas."
Uses of the Seas , ed. Edmund A. Gullion. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.
20. Jackson, Henry M. , "The Suez Canal and International
Stability." Sea Power
,
May 1974, pp. 8-9.
21. Janis, Mark W. , "The Soviet Navy and Ocean Law." Naval
War College Review . Mar. -Apr. 1974, pp. 52-58.
22. Jukes Geoffrey, The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy
(Adeiphi Paper #87) . London: The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1972.
23. Kidd, Isaac C, "View from the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet




24. Lydolph, Paul E., Geography of the U.S.S.R. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964.
25. MccGwire, Michael, Soviet Naval Developments- -Capability
and Context . New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
26. Miller, Richard A., "Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine
and Japan's Jugular." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Feb. 1974, pp. 18-29.
27. Mitchell, Donald W. , A History of Russian and Soviet
Seapower . New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.
28. O'Connell, D.P., "Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International
Law." The British Yearboo k of Interna t ional Law - 1971 .




29. O'Connell, D.P, "Naval Policy and International Lav: and
International Relations." Britain and the Se a. Confer-
ence records, Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 12-14
Sept. 1973.
30. Oliver, Edward F., "Malacca: Dire Straits." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings
,
Jun. 1973, pp. 26-33.
31. Owen, David, "Western Naval Strategy for the Eighties."
The Yearbook of World Affairs 1974 . London: Stevens §
Sons , 1974.
32. Oxman, Bernard H. , and John R. Stevenson, "The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974
Caracas Session." American Journal of International Law
,
Vol. 69, No. 1, Jan. 1975, pp. 1-30.
33. Pardo, Arvid, "A Statement on the Future Law of the Sea
in Light of Current Trends in Negotiations." Ocean£,•...>- W -^ WV^ii^il^. ii^-Ji.^.^ J_ .1 I , > ^ £,




34. Problem of the Turkish Straits, The , Department of State
Publication 2752, Near Eastern Series 5, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947.
35. Rollins, Patrick J. "Russia's FicLj.Liou^ Naval Txadi-
tion." Oceans -Magazine . Jan. 1973, pp. 65-71.
36. Smith, Clyde A. , "Constraints of Naval Geography on




37. Smith, Clyde A., "The Meaning and Significance of the




38. Smith, Robert W. , "An Analysis of the Strategic Attributes
of International Straits: A Geographical Perspective."'
Maritime Studies and Management
,
vol. 2, no. 2, Oct.
1974, pp. 88-101.
39. Synhorst, Gerald E., "Soviet Strategic Interest in the
Mar i t ime Arctic." U.S. Naval Institute P roceeding s
,
May 1973, pp. 90-111. . .
40. "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Articles on
Straits Used for International Navigation." International
Legal Materials
,
Jan, 1973, p. 40.
208

41. Wells, Linton II, "Japan and the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea." Ocean Development and
International Law, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring 1974, pp. 65-91
42. Wiggins, Joseph L
of the Sea to the
"Implications of the Emerging Law
S. Navy." Masters Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., Mar. 1974.
4 3 . Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1970-1971 .






1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93940












6. Commander, Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-12) 2
Naval Intelligence Command Headquarters
2461 Eisenhower Ave.
Alexandria, VA 2231
7. CDR. Malvin D. Bruce . 1
COMCRUDESPAC Staff
San Diego. CA 92132
8. Dr. Robert L. Friedheim 1
Director, Ocean Allocation Study
Center for Naval Analyses
1401 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, VA 22209
9. CDR. Clyde A. Smith, USN 1
University of Rhode Island




10. Professor D.P. O'Connell
All Souls College
Oxford, England
11. CDR. W.P. Pettyjohn, USN




2278 Covent Gardens Ct.
Reston, VA 22091
13. Richard T. Ackley
Associate Dean
California State College
5500 State College Parkway
San Bernardino, CA 92407














1 The significance of
international straits





c.l The significance of
international straits
to Soviet nava4 opera-
tions.
thesD 18845
The significance of international strait
3 2768 001 02516 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
a
